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Abstract 
Operational risk management and measurement has been paid an increasing attention in recent 
years – namely due to the Basel II requirements that were to be complied with by all international active 
financial institutions by January 2008 and also due to recent severe operational risk loss events. This 
rigorous thesis focuses on operational risk measurement techniques and on regulatory capital estimation 
methods.  A data sample of operational losses provided by a Central European bank is analyzed using 
several approaches. Multiple statistical concepts for the Loss Distribution Approach are considered. One 
of the methods used for operational risk management is a scenario analysis. Under this method custom 
plausible loss events defined in a particular scenario are merged with the original data sample and their 
impact on capital estimates and on the financial institution as a whole is evaluated. Two main problems 
are assessed in this rigorous thesis – what is the most appropriate statistical method to measure and 
model operational loss data distribution and what is the impact of hypothetical plausible events on the 
financial institution. The g&h distribution was evaluated to be the most suitable one for operational risk 
modeling because its results are consistent even while using scenario analysis method. The method 
based on combination of historical loss events modeling and scenario analysis provides reasonable 
capital estimates for the financial institution and allows to measure impact of very extreme events and 
also to mitigate operational risk exposure. 
 
Abstrakt 
 Zájem o problematiku řízení a meření operačního rizika se v posledních letech prudce zvyšuje – 
zejména kvůli požadavkům kapitálové přimeřenosti definovaných v Basel II, které musí k 1. lednu 2008 
splňovat všechny mezinárodně aktivní finanční instituce a také kvůli závažným ztrátám v oblasti 
operačního rizika, které se staly v nedávné minulosti. Tato rigorózní práce se zaměřuje na techniky 
meření operačního rizika a metody odhadů kapitálové přiměřenosti. Soubor ztrát operačního rizika, který 
byl poskutnut středoevropskou bankou, je analyzován pomocí různých přístupů. Je posuzováno několik 
statistických konceptů používaných pro modelování rozdělení operačních ztrát. Jednou z metod řízení 
operačního rizika je metoda analýzy scénářů. V této metodě jsou definovány hypotetické ztrátové 
události a tyto události jsou přidány do souboru empirických událostí a následně je posuzován vliv 
výsledného souboru událostí na výpočet kapitálové přiměřenosti a na finanční instituci jako celek. Tato 
rigorózní práce se zejména věnuje následujícím dvěma problémům – jaká je nejpřijatelnější statistická 
metoda na měření a modelování rozdělení ztrát operačního rizika a jaký je vliv hypotetických událostí na 
finanční instituci. G&h distribuce byla vyhodnocena jako nejvhodnější pro modelování ztrát operačního 
rizika a výsledky kapitálových odhadů pomocí tohoto rozdělení jsou konzistentní i po aplikaci metody 
analýzy scénářů. Metoda založená na kombinaci empirických dat a analýzy scénářů tak poskytuje 
věrohodné odhady kapitálové přiměřenosti a dovoluje finanční instituci měřit vliv extrémních událostí a 
zavádět postupy zmírňující míru operačního rizika.  
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Introduction 
 
In this paper we focus on modeling and stress testing of economic and regulatory capital set 
aside to cover unexpected losses of a medium size Central European bank (BANK). There are two main 
questions this thesis is aimed to answer: 
 What is the appropriate statistical method to model OR loss data distribution and measure 
reasonable capital estimates for the institution? 
 What is the impact of extreme events defined in particular extreme case scenarios on the capital 
estimates and on the financial institution? 
 Firstly, the risk measurement statistical techniques must be evaluated and the most suitable 
ones used further for scenario analysis method in order to test whether those methods are consistent 
even if original data sample is enriched by adding a few extreme losses. The best method for capital 
estimate computation is then chosen and effects of scenarios to the financial institution are assessed. 
 Several statistical distributions are used to model loss severity distribution and compute capital 
estimates. It is expected that the best results will be provided by a distribution that can reasonable 
model body as well as the heavy right tail of the data sample. On the other hand,  techniques that focus 
just on the tail of the distribution might not provide consistent results if the tail is contaminated by loss 
events defined during scenario analysis. The distribution that is expected to be the most suitable for 
modeling the operational risk data is the g&h distribution used by Dutta, Perry (2007). So the null and 
alternative hypothesis can be stated as: 
 H0: The g&h distribution provides consistent capital estimates for scenario analysis method  
 H1: Extreme Value Theory  provides consistent capital estimates for scenario analysis method 
 Once this hypothesis is assessed the effects of extreme events on the financial institution can be 
evaluated. It might be assumed that the bank will not be able to cover the worst case joint scenario  
losses, because the loss amounts will be too high to be covered by the bank capital. On the other hand, 
the bank should be able to cover average joint scenario losses. 
This rigorous thesis is organized as follows: The first chapter provides an overview of operational 
risk concepts, Basel II measurement and risk management techniques. The second chapter focuses on a 
detailed overview of the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA). The third chapter analyzes the data sample of 
BANK and proposes distributions that can best model the data sample. These distributions are then used 
for  capital estimates computation. The fourth chapter provides a theoretical overview of stress testing 
and scenario analysis methodology. In the fifth chapter the loss events defined in particular scenarios are 
merged with original data sample and new capital estimates are computed. Finally, the last part of this 
paper makes conclusion of the findings and results and proposes ideas for future research.  
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Chapter 1 - Operational Risk & Basel II 
 
 This chapter provides a basic overview of literature about operational risk and scenario analysis. 
Afterwards the concepts of operational risk (OR), economic and regulatory capital and application of 
Basel II regulatory rules are being discussed. 
 
1.1 Literature overview 
 
 Taken into consideration the scarcity and confidentiality of OR loss data, there are only few 
papers that explore specifics of OR data and are able to measure OR exposure with the accuracy and 
precision  comparable with other sources of risk. The most comprehensive ones are Chernobai (2007), 
Dutta, Perry (2007), Embrechts (2006), de Fountnouvelle (2006) , Mignolla, Ugoccioni (2006) and Degen 
(2006). The scenario analysis method theory is just very briefly mentioned in papers from Cihak (2004), 
Rosengren (2006) or Arai (2006). 
 
1.2 Classification of risks 
 
Banks and other financial institutions are facing multiple risks that affect their financial results. A 
financial institution is required to manage these risks and allocate necessary amount of capital that is 
sufficient to cover potential losses caused by the occurrence of loss events in order to ensure 
sustainability of its business activities. A risk is thus defined as a measure to capture the potential of 
suffering a loss. Risks can be classified into several categories. The Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS)1 classifies financial risk sources as shown in figure 1.1.  
Until very recently risk management was focused just on credit risk - the risk that a counterparty 
will fail to meet its obligations – and market risk – the risk of losses due to changes in market conditions. 
The other sources of risks were not treated as important as would be relevant. Due to serious changes in 
financial market conditions the bank risk profiles significantly altered in the last years. The main drivers 
of these changes were “globalization and deregulation, accelerated technological innovation and 
revolutionary advances in the information network, an increase in the score of financial services and 
products”2 and an increasing amount of mergers and acquisitions.  Because of those changes banks 
                                                             
1 BCBS (2006) 
2 Chernobai (2007) 
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became more exposed to losses that occur during the bank operations and the operational risk 
management has been given appropriate attention of both banks and financial market regulators.  
Figure 1.1 - Topology of financial risks in banks 
 
 Source: Chernobai (2007) 
Even though these events are of rather infrequent occurrence, they often cause large damage to 
bank operations and so financial institutions must consider such events for the risk management. “As a 
result, a bank will create provisions for expected losses and set aside capital for unexpected losses”3.  
 
1.3 Operational risk 
 
The concept of operational risk (OR) is relatively new. OR has been defined as a separate source 
of risk just few years ago. But it has been given an increasing attention by both, banks and regulators, in 
                                                             
3 Teply, Chalupka (2008) 
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recent years and OR has become a “hot topic for both practitioners and academics”4. Even though the 
OR measurement techniques are still under development and there is still much work left to do in the OR 
management field. This applies to the relevant terminology as well.  
The most common definition of OR is given in Basel II as “the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. This definition 
includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk.”5 However, other definitions exist as well. 
A very general definition says that OR is a consequence of doing business. OR thus bundles relatively 
broad area of risks which differs it from market and credit risk. The common idea is that operational risk 
encompasses those risks, not covered under credit and market risk,  that have a measurable financial 
impact. Table 1.1 categorizes OR by its main drivers. 
Table 1.1: Main factors of operational risk 
 
Source: Based on Teply, Chalupka (2008) 
There are some specifics of OR in comparison to market and credit risks that in general make OR 
more difficult to manage. “The main differences are the fact that operational risk is not taken on a 
voluntary basis but is a natural activity performed by a financial institution”6 and a noticeable lack of 
hedging instruments. The main differences are summarized in Table 1.2. 
 
 
                                                             
4 Teply (2007) 
5 BCBS (2006) 
6 Teply, Chalupka (2008) 
People
•Fraud, collusion and 
other criminal 
activities
•Violation of internal 
or external rules
•Management errors
•Loss of important 
employees
•Security violations
Systems
•IT problems
•Unauthorized 
access
•Unavailability of 
data
•Communication 
failures
•Utility outages 
Processes
•Execution, 
registration, 
settlement errors 
(transaction risk)
•Model and 
methodology errors 
(model risk)
•Accounting  errors
•Compliance issues
•Inadequate 
attribution of 
responsibilities 
External Events
•Criminal activities
•Political and military 
events
•Supplier failures
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Table 1.2: Risk types comparison 
 
Source: Based on Teply, Chalupka (2008) 
There are some widely known and severe magnitude of OR events that happened in recent years 
– the most publicly known examples of OR would be those caused by fraud, natural disaster or 
unauthorized trading – one very recent OR event from the Czech Republic is the theft of USD 31M in the 
G4S Cash Services. The other example would be a failure of internet banking of Ceska Sporitelna in 
12/2007, or a loss of USD 12M suffered by BANK due to improper rounding in interbank transactions. 
 The mostly know foreign OR events starts with a large loss in the amount of USD 7,500M caused 
to Société Générale  by unauthorized derivatives trading by Jerome Kerviel. The first “top class” OR event 
is attributed to Nick Leeson who caused 1,000M loss to the Barings bank by unauthorized trading. 
Another category of events is connected with terrorist acts or natural disasters – like losses caused by 
9/11 or hurricane Katrina. Each of those events exceeds loss amount of USD 1,000M. 
It is clear that those events are the most severe but very infrequent ones. They represent high 
risk and in some cases can be destructive for a financial institution. There are other loss events that are 
more common but cause much smaller loss to a bank – like an input error caused by an employee, a 
credit card fraud or a failure of a supplier.  
 
1.4 Basel II 
 
Since the number of OR events exceeding USD 100m loss is higher than 100 since 19807, it is 
clear that financial institutions must manage the OR and regulators are obliged to monitor how financial 
                                                             
7 Fontnouvelle (2003) 
Market an Credit Risks
• Consciously and willingly faced
• Speculative risk, both losses and 
profits
• Positive risk-return relationship
• Easy to identify and understand
• Easy to measure and quantify
• Availability of hedging instruments
• Comparatively easy to price and 
transfer
Operational risk
• Unavoidable
• Pure risk, implies only losses
• Non consistent risk-return 
relationship
• Difficult to identify and understand
• Difficult to measure and quantify
• Lack of effective hedging 
instruments
• Difficult to price and transfer 
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institutions do it. Because of that, the Basel II Capital Accord document finalized in June 2006 specifically 
includes OR as one of the risks to be considered for the minimum capital requirements. The regulatory 
capital is designed to reflect the exposure of each bank to operational risk. 
 The aim of Basel II is to set the same rules of the game for all internationally active banks. The 
regulatory framework is divided into three pillars as shown on figure 1.2. Pillar 1 sets the rule for 
minimum capital requirements for all risks that banks are subject to. Pillar 2 describes the revision 
process done by regulators and finally Pillar 3 defines policies for market discipline and information 
disclosure. The Basel II framework includes identification, measurement, monitoring, reporting control 
and mitigation of operational risk. All internationally active banks were obliged to comply with Basel II by 
January 2007.8 
Figure 1.2 – Basel II concept 
 
Source: Teply, Chalupka (2007) 
 
 
                                                             
8 There was a one year extension granted for this deadline, therefore the banks have to comply with Basel II by 
January 2008 
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1.5 Regulatory and economic capital 
 
 Regulatory capital is the amount of capital necessary to provide adequate coverage of banks’ 
exposures to financial risks as defined in the capital adequacy rules set by the Basel II. “A one-year 
minimum regulatory capital is calculated as 8% of risk-weighted assets.”9  Empirical studies show that 
operational risk regulatory capital, in general, constitutes about 25% of overall capital adequacy 
requirements.  
 On the other hand, economic capital “is a buffer against future, unexpected losses brought 
about by credit, market, and operational risks inherent in the business of lending money”10  or 
alternatively economic capital might be defined as the amount necessary to be in the financial business. 
Figure 1.3: Classification of bank’s requirements according to risk 
 
 
 Source: Based on Teply, Chalupka (2008) & BCBS(2006) 
 Further we will focus on modeling both regulatory and economic capital for OR because this 
concept is to be used for the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) as it should cover all unexpected 
losses – even the extreme events with the Value at Risk (VaR) higher than 99.9%. Regulatory capital 
covers expected losses and unexpected losses only to a certain confidence level and it does not consider 
                                                             
9 Chernobai (2007) 
10 Mejstrik, Pecena, Teply (2007) 
Regulatory capital 
Economic capital  
Mean 99.9th percentile 
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the extreme events11 like economic capital does. The regulatory capital will be further defined as the 
VaR0.999 measure and the economic capital as the CVaR0.99 measure
12.   
 
1.6 Basel II operational risk measurement techniques 
 
Basel II sets three operational measurement methodologies for calculating operational risk 
capital charge “in a continuum of increasing sophistication and risk sensitivity”13 . The first two 
approaches are top-down approaches, because the capital charge is allocated according to a fixed 
proportion of gross income. The third approach is a bottom-up approach, because the capital charge is 
estimated based on actual internal OR loss data. 
Figure 1.4 – OR measurement approaches 
 
 Source: Napiontek (2004) 
                                                             
11 Under AMA expected losses can be covered by provisions and can be excluded from regulatory capital charge 
12 For more info on VaR and CVaR measures see chapter 2 
13 BCBS (2006) 
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The motivation for banks to move from a less advanced to a more advanced technique is the 
increased risk sensitivity and in general lower expected capital requirement. Once a bank chooses to 
move to a more sophisticated approach there is no option to revert back. The relationship between the 
measurement techniques is shown on figure 1.4. 
 
1.6.1 Basic Indicator Approach 
 
 The simplest approach is The Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) which estimates the capital charge 
as a fixed percentage of an average gross income14 over the last three years. Currently the parameter 𝛼 
is set to 15%. Only those years, when the gross income was positive, are considered. 
15 
This approach is fairly simple. It does not require too much calculation. On the other hand, the 
required capital level is quite high. This approach does not allow the differentiation among different 
bank activities, that are likely to have different operational risk exposure and sensitivity. Therefore BIA  is 
not suitable for an international bank specific.  
There are no specific criteria for use of the BIA. However, it is not very beneficial for a bank to 
choose this approach and it is expected that all financial institutions will move to a more sophisticated 
approaches. Internationally active banks are not allowed to use this method at all. 
 
1.6.2 Standardized Approach 
 
The second approach is The Standardized Approach (SA). This technique improves BIA by 
dividing the bank activities into eight business lines. Each business line is assigned a different percentage, 
so called beta factor, as a measure of OR exposure. The regulatory capital charge is then computed as a 
sum of weighted averages of gross income per each of the business lines for the last three years. The 
particular business lines and beta factors are listed in Table 1.3. The formula for capital requirement 
under the Standardized Approach is: 
16 
It is clear, that this approach might underpin the merits of OR better than BIA. Even though the 
mean value of beta factors is 15%, the business lines, that are most sensitive to low impact OR events, 
                                                             
14 Gross income is net interest income plus net non-interest income 
15 BCBS (2006), GI denotes Gross Income 
16 BCBS (2006) 
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are assigned lower beta factor of 12% – it is namely the retail banking, where most of the OR events 
occur. On the other hand, the business lines more sensitive to extreme events are assigned a higher beta 
factor of 18%. Given the higher weights of the business lines with lower beta factors, the overall 
regulatory capital charge estimation is supposed to be lower than the one calculated using the BIA.  
Table 1.3 – The standardized approach business line mapping  
Business Lines Beta Factors 
Corporate finance 18% 
Trading and sales 18% 
Retail banking 12% 
Commercial banking 15% 
Payment and settlement 18% 
Agency services 15% 
Asset management 12% 
Retail brokerage 12% 
 Source: BCBS (2006) 
But even this approach lacks a risk sensitivity – the empirical loss data are not studied and just 
preset beta factors are used. Moreover, a perfect correlation is implied between the business lines and 
so the “results are likely to overestimate actual amount of capital required to capitalize operational 
risk17”. Banks that want to use the SA are subject to many qualitative and quantitative requirements set 
by Basel II18. These arguments lead to the conclusion, that even the SA is not suitable for large and 
internationally active banks. 
 
1.6.3 Advanced Measurement Approach 
 
The most advanced approach for operational risk assessment is called Advanced Measurement 
Approach (AMA). “Under the AMA, the regulatory capital requirement will equal the risk measure 
generated by the bank’s internal operational risk measurement system using the quantitative and 
qualitative criteria19” that are given in Basel II.  Use of AMA is subject to a supervisory approval. 
Under the AMA the OR data are divided into the seven event type classes. The classes are listed 
in Table 1.4. The particular AMA technique chosen by a bank should work with a matrix of seven event 
types and eight business lines. 
                                                             
17 Chernobai (2007) 
18 Particular qualitative and quantitative requirements are listed in BCBS (2006). Comments on those requirements 
are beyond the focus of this paper 
19 BCBS (2006) 
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Table 1.4 – Event type classes 
Event type class Example 
Internal fraud Forgery, Insider trading 
External fraud Robbery, Hacking damage 
Employment Practices, Workplace Safety Discrimination, Termination issues 
Clients, Products, Business Practices Antitrust, Product flaws 
Damage to Physical Assets Natural disaster 
Business Disruption, System Failure Hardware or software failure 
Execution, Delivery, Process management Delivery failure, Model failure 
Source: BCBS (2006) 
Since the operational risk measurement techniques are still under development, Basel II does 
not fix any standard technique the for AMA, thus the banks are allowed to develop their own models. 
Basel II encourages the banks to further develop increasingly risk sensitive OR allocation techniques, that 
will correspondent with the empirical loss data for the particular bank. The AMA thus provides significant 
flexibility to banks – on the other hand, regulators are given better control than the AMA techniques 
used by a particular financial institution. 
The criteria for adopting the AMA are more specific and strict than those for the SA. Except for 
organizational requirements for OR management Basel II requires the banks to adopt techniques that 
can “reasonably estimate unexpected losses based on the combined use of internal and external loss 
data, scenario analysis, back testing, Bayesian methods and bank-specific business environment and 
internal control factors”20.  
Basel II also mentions the use of both internal and external data, capturing of business 
environment and internal control factors of a bank as well as an allowance of partial risk mitigation using 
insurance21.  Basel II differentiates between unexpected losses that are to be covered by the regulatory 
capital and the expected losses that are to be covered by provisions if it is allowed by national 
accounting standards.   
In the BCBS(2006) document, three approaches were proposed for the AMA22. The Internal 
Measurement Approach constructs the matrix of business lines and event types. For each of the 56 cells 
the capital charge is determined as the product of exposure indicator, probability and loss amount of an 
event. This approach still assumes perfect correlation among the business lines/event types so the 
capital charge estimation is likely to be overestimated.  
                                                             
20 BCBS (2006) 
21 Details can be found in BCBS (2006) 
22 BCBS (2001) 
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The Scoreboard Approach is “highly qualitative approach, under which the banks determine an 
initial level of operational risk capital at the business line level, and then modify these amounts over time 
on the basis of scoreboards”23.  
The final approach defined for the AMA is the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA). This approach 
makes use of the exact operational loss frequency and severity distributions analyzing the historic OR 
data. The operational capital charge is computed as the simple sum of the one-year value-at-risk 
measure for each business line/event type pair using a high confidence level (99.9%). Even though the 
LDA is highly risk sensitive and in general provides reasonable estimates of the capital charge, still the 
LDA tolerates the assumption of perfect correlation.  
 The approaches mentioned above complement each other – while the LDA is a backward looking 
quantitative technique, the scoreboard approach focuses on forward-looking qualitative indicators and 
so all these approaches should be combined together in order to successfully manage OR.  In this 
rigorous thesis we will focus particularly on the LDA approach based on the available OR loss data 
provided by BANK. This approach will be then combined with scenario analysis method which is 
described in chapter 4. 
 
1.7  Common OR management and measurement techniques 
 
 Even though Basel II is the main driver for implementing OR management and measurement 
techniques, other reasons to focus on OR exist as well. Even if a financial institution decides to use the 
BIA or the SA, it can benefit from deploying custom OR management techniques in order to manage 
economic capital and ensure, that the company will be able to survive some severe operational risk 
events. The appropriate OR management can help to improve economic results of a financial institution. 
 The other measurement methods not specifically mentioned in Basel II are also being used by 
financial institutions24. There are four main techniques used to measure OR. The basic features of those 
techniques are listed in Table 1.5. 
 The most theoretical measurement approach is the LDA. This method was already explained 
above and will be discussed in more details in the following chapter. Because of the fact, that the OR 
management is a relatively new concept, there are not enough historical OR events in internal loss 
database of a financial institution and thus statistical methods applied on a limited data sample may 
provide biased or inconsistent results. It is assumed that as the number of events in internal and external 
databases will grow, the LDA approach will become the prevalent one. Some other disadvantages of the 
                                                             
23 Chernobai (2007) 
24 BANK internal instructions 
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LDA exist. The LDA is purely based on historical OR events that might not be the best predictor of the 
future and might reflect crucial changes in OR exposure of a financial institution with a several years gap. 
So even if the LDA is the most advanced, objective and theoretical method it is still useful to combine it 
with other approaches in order to control OR exposure of a financial institution. 
Table 1.5: OR measurement techniques 
 
 Source: Author 
 The second method – the Risk Control Self Assessment (RCSA) -  is a subjective qualitative 
method that constructs a map of inherent OR across all bank processes and departments. The inherent 
OR is the risk inherent to a process before adopting any control or precautionary mechanisms. Such a 
map provides a qualitative classification of OR exposure level. The responsible employees within a bank 
are sent a questionnaire and they are asked to classify severity of inherent OR category and also risk 
mitigation parameters and control precautionary mechanisms that would decrease overall risk exposure 
of a financial institution. Those questionnaires are then being aggregated and evaluated. They provide 
information about residual risk that a bank faces after implementation of the risk mitigation practices. If 
the residual risk level is high, then a bank should either further improve control mechanisms, decide to 
take the risk or outsource such a process. The RCSA method provides a useful information about quality 
of OR management in a bank. However, since the feedback given by a responsible person is subjective, 
the results might be biased – e.g. managers might have a temptation to overestimate risk exposure of 
their department just to be safe, should an extreme event happen. The main benefit of the RCSA method 
is that it can be applied to new banking products and so potential riskiness of those products can be 
assessed before releasing this product to public. This method is being widely used by financial 
institutions also because of the lack of sufficiently large OR event database. The RCSA method 
corresponds with the Scoreboard approach mentioned in the Basel II document. 
  The third commonly used method is the Key Risk Indicators (KRI) approach. The KRI are defined 
as quantifiable parameters that are able to indicate a change in the OR profile in a bank process or 
business line. An example would be a number of new employees, an amount of contractual penalty etc. 
LDA
•Application of 
statistical methods 
on historical OR 
events
•Quantitative 
methods
RCSA
•Inherent and 
residual risk 
estimation
•Risk mitigation 
techniques
•Subjective 
qualitative 
methods
KRI
•Risk exposure 
measurement 
system
•Objective 
qualitative method
Scenario analysis
•Based on 
hypothetical or 
historical scenario
•Assess impact of 
extreme events
•Quantitative 
method
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Once values of those parameters exceed predefined interval, then the OR exceeded acceptable limits 
and OR managers should therefore implement some corrective action. KRI method is used as a periodical 
measurement of OR exposure. 
 The last but not least method is the Scenario Analysis (SCA). This method can be classified as a 
stress testing method. A financial institution can obtain valuable results from analyzing scenarios that 
cover infrequent but severe risks that can have severe impact on bank operations. The other reason is to 
measure the exposition to plausible risks that has not happened so far and thus are not registered in the 
internal OR loss database. The theory of the SCA is of major importance in this rigorous thesis and will be 
further discussed in chapter 4. Application of the SCA, including creation of a custom scenario, is then 
the subject of chapter 5. 
 
1.7.1 OR mitigation techniques 
 
 Once a financial institution determines the specifics of its OR exposure, its managers can take 
several actions to manage OR. There are five ways to manage OR – they are described in Table 1.6. The 
aim of a financial institution is to minimize the amount of residual OR. The procedure is to identify the 
level of inherent risk, implement risk mitigation techniques and then evaluate the level of residual risk. If 
some risk is not controllable by internal means, then the risk should be transferred either to insurance 
company,25 to a 3rd party using outsourcing or such an activity should be limited.  
Table 1.6: Risk mitigation techniques 
 
 Source: Author  
                                                             
25 Basel II allows insurance coverage up to 20% to be considered for regulatory capital estimates 
Precautionary 
arrangements
•Aimed to avoid OR 
events
•Control directives, 
standardization of 
processes, trainings 
etc.
•Best practice for 
high frequency, low 
severity events
Business continutity 
management
•Plans for getting 
back to normal 
situation, should an 
extreme OR event 
happen
•Can mitigate impact 
of severe events
•Requires periodical 
training of those 
plans
Transfer risk to 
insurance companies
• Complex insurance 
plans for the case of 
extreme OR events
•Usually used for low 
frequency, high 
severity events
Outsourcing
•Transfer the 
activities that are 
not directly 
connected with 
bank activities to a 
third party
Taking the risk
•If long term costs of 
OR management is 
higher than 
potential loss 
resulting from a 
specific OR event
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Chapter 2 - LDA methodology 
 
 This chapter provides a comprehensive theoretical overview of the LDA methodology, describes 
the specifics of OR data and explains the statistical distributions and techniques that are used for OR loss 
severity  and frequency distributions modeling and for regulatory and economic capital estimation. 
 
2.1 Specifics of OR data 
 
Empirical evidences prove that OR data have certain specifics, as mentioned above, which 
distinguish them from credit and market risks data and that causes techniques used for assessment of 
credit and market risks unsuitable for OR management. From this point of view, OR management has 
something in common with insurance mathematics and so some of the insurance methodology can be 
applied to OR assessment – e.g. Extreme Value Theory (EVT). 
The OR data are specific by the fact that there exist events that cause very severe losses to a 
financial institution, but they are not so frequent. For example, there is a very low probability that Czech 
Republic would be affected by a thousand-year flood – but it did happen in 2002 and this event had 
negative consequences for all Czech banks. Example of distributions of OR loss severity data is shown on 
Figure 2.1. The x-axis denotes the loss amount and the y-axis shows the frequency of events for different 
loss amount levels.  
Figure 2.1 – Example of OR severity distribution 
 
 Source: Chernobai (2007) 
OR data suggest that there exists two kinds of events – the first category consists the losses of 
high frequency/low severity that are relatively unimportant for a bank and can often be prevented using 
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risk mitigation techniques and covered by provisions. The second category consists of the low 
frequency/high severity events that are more important for a bank. “Banks must be particularly attentive 
to these losses as these cause the greatest financial consequences to the institutions.”26 
If we consider statistical distribution of OR loss severity data the “existing empirical evidence 
suggest that the general pattern of operational loss data is characterized by high kurtosis, severe right-
skewness and a very heavy right tail created by several outlying events.”27  Distributions fitting such data 
are called leptokurtic. As will be shown later, the data sample provided by BANK exhibits the same 
characteristics. 
Because of those specifics of OR loss data it is quite clear that the estimation based on 
elementary statistical distributions would not fit the data very well because the tail events would not be 
covered by e.g. normal distribution and the predicted loss estimations would be unacceptably low.  
 
2.2 Models for OR measurement 
 
 There exist two fundamentally different approaches to develop models for OR : 
 The top – down approach 
 The bottom-up approach 
 The first one quantifies operational risk without attempting to identify the events or causes of 
losses while the second one quantifies operational risk on a microlevel being based on identified internal 
events. Both approaches should be combined. 
 The top-down approach group includes, among others, the Risk indicator models that rely on a 
number of OR exposure indicators to track operational risks and the Scenario Analysis and Stress Testing 
models that are “estimated based on the what-if scenarios generated with reference to expert opinion, 
external data, catastrophic events occurred in other banks, or imaginary high-magnitude events. Experts 
estimate the expected risk amounts and their associated probabilities of occurrence.”28 The theory of 
stress testing will be covered in chapter 4. 
 The bottom-up approach group includes actuarial type models that will be further discussed in 
this chapter. Those models have two key components – frequency and loss severity distributions that 
model historical OR loss data sample. The capital charge is then computed as the value of VaR0.99 
measure of the one-year aggregate distribution loss. The actuarial models use different type of loss 
severity distribution and so they are classified to three groups: 
 Empirical loss distribution 
                                                             
26 Chernobai (2007) 
27 Chernobai (2007) 
28 Chernobai (2007) 
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 Parametric loss distribution 
 Extreme value theory 
 We will focus on each of these categories later on. 
 Another important feature of OR is the scarcity of available historical data. As of now the banks 
usually do not have more than five years of loss data in their OR loss data internal databases and even 
within those five years the data collection methods underwent a significant development – the tail of the 
distribution cannot be modeled with a sufficient statistical fit, if only very few extreme events exist in 
such an internal database. So the limited data sample lacks sufficient explanatory power. There were 
some methods proposed to reduce this limitation:29 
 Pooling internal and external data samples 
 Supplementing actual losses with near-miss losses 
 Using scenario analysis and stress tests 
 There exists a software, working with databases,  that contains a sufficient amount of external 
losses, both empirical and imaginary. Because of the fact that those databases are not publicly available, 
we will not work with external data and so the overall capital charge might be underestimated. 
 Because of the scarcity of available historical data and because of confidentiality of those data, 
some researches even use simulated data which is quite uncommon technique for other risk areas. 
 Yet another topic should be mentioned – data arrival process. Both frequency and severity 
distributions of OR data are important and thus banks have to record both the date of occurrence and 
the amount of loss. There are likely to be observed a seasonal effects in data collection process because 
of the recording and accounting practices common in financial institutions. 
 
2.3 Frequency distributions 
 
 The studies based on empirical data suggest that choice of frequency distribution is not as much 
important as an appropriate choice of loss severity distribution.30 The banks should develop a solid 
mechanism for recording OR data. The most common frequency distributions are the Poisson 
distribution and the negative binomial distribution. The survey of studies done by Chernobai (2007) 
suggest that the Poisson distribution will be a reasonable solution for modeling OR data. We will use the 
Poisson distribution later on for modeling frequency distribution of the data sample provided by BANK. 
 
 
                                                             
29 Chernobai (2007) 
30 De Fontnouvelle (2003) 
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2.3.1 Poisson distribution 
 
 The Poisson distribution is a discrete probability distribution that expresses the probability of a 
number of events occurring during a fixed period of time under the condition that these events occur 
with a known average rate and independently of the time since the last event occurred. If the expected 
number of events during a unit time interval is 𝜆, then the probability that there are exactly k 
occurrences is estimated using the following equation: 
𝑃 𝑋 = 𝑘 =  
𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝑘
𝑘 !
  , k = 0,1,… 
 The Poisson process assumes constant mean and is therefore often called a homogeneous 
Poisson process.  Both mean and variance of a Poisson random variable are equal to the intensity rate 𝜆.  
The MLE parameter estimate of the intensity rate 𝜆  equals to the sample mean. 
 
2.3.2 Negative binomial distribution 
 
 The negative binomial distribution is a generalized case of the Poisson distribution, in which the 
intensity rate 𝜆 is no longer constant but is assumed to follow a gamma distribution31. The probability 
mass function of negative binomial distribution is: 
𝑃 𝑋 = 𝑘 =   
𝑛 + 𝑘 − 1
𝑘
 𝑝𝑘(1 − 𝑝)𝑛  ,   𝑘 = 0, 1, … . , where  𝑝 =  
𝛽
1+𝛽
 , 
where X is a Poisson distributed random variable with intensity rate 𝜆 which is gamma distributed with 
parameters n and 𝛽. 
 
2.4 Loss severity distributions 
 
 Loss severity distributions  are divided into two main approaches: 
 Nonparametric approach 
 Parametric approach 
 The first approach simply uses the density of the data sample. This approach might be used, if it 
is assumed that the empirical data do not follow any conventional distribution or if the available data set 
is sufficiently comprehensive.32 The latter assumption obviously  does not hold in case of OR. 
                                                             
31
 See chapter 3.4.2.3 for details on gamma distribution 
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 The second approach tries to find a conventional loss distribution that would best fit the  
empirical loss data. Such a distribution must be “right-skewed, possibly leptokurtic, and have support on 
positive values.”33 
 
2.4.1 Empirical loss distribution 
 
 The empirical loss distribution approach makes two critical assumptions regarding the future loss 
data: 
 Historical data are sufficiently comprehensive 
 All past losses are equally likely to reappear in the future, and losses of other magnitudes cannot 
occur 
 Empirical distribution density function has the following form: 
𝑃 𝑋 = 𝑘 =  
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 < 𝑥
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
 
 The empirical distribution is often used in goodness of fit tests – namely in Q-Q plots.34 
 
2.4.2 Parametric loss distribution 
 
 Only those parametric distributions, which are able to underpin merits of OR data, should be 
used. Five key performance measures should be considered while choosing a particular severity 
distribution:35 
 Good fit 
 Realistic – consider whether realistic capital estimates are generated 
 Well-specified – logically consistence with sample data 
 Flexible 
 Simple 
 There exist quite many parametric distributions used to model loss severity data. The most 
common ones are exponential, lognormal, Weibull, gamma and g&h distributions. Those distributions 
vary in the number of parameters starting from one (exponential) to four (g&h).   
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
32 Rosenberg (2004) 
33 Chernobai (2007) 
34 See chapter 2.5 for more details on Q-Q plots 
35 Dutta, Perry (2007) 
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 In the third chapter we will evaluate which distributions best fit the data provided by BANK and 
will follow up just with those distributions that satisfy the efficiency measures mentioned above. The 
maximum Likelihood (MLE) or Method of Moments (MoM) methods will be used for estimating 
parameters of a particular distributions. Based on the inverse distribution function, random variates will 
be generated using the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation and the results will be compared with the data 
sample in order to question statistical fit. The following section provides basic characteristics of the 
selected distributions. 
 
2.4.2.1 Exponential distribution 
 
 The exponential distribution is the simplest distribution used to model loss severity data. It has 
just one scale parameter 𝜆. This distribution has moderately heavy tail that exponentially decays. This 
does not correspond with the empirical data specifics very well. 
 The  density function has the following form: 
𝑓 𝑥 =  𝜆𝑒−𝜆𝑥 , 𝑥 > 0 
 The MLE estimator for scale parameter is a converse value of the sample mean 𝜆 =  
1
𝑥 
 . The 
random variates can be generated using the inverse transform method by 𝑋 =  −
1
𝜆
log𝑈,36 where U is 
distributed uniformly on interval (0,1). 
 
2.4.2.2 Lognormal distribution 
 
 The lognormal distribution consists of two parameters – location 𝜇 and scale 𝜍. If the random 
variable X is lognormal distributed, then the random variable log(X) is normally distributed. This 
distribution has a fatter tail than the previous one. The density function has the following form: 
𝑓 𝑥 =  
1
 2𝜋𝜍𝑥
𝑒
−
(log 𝑥− 𝜇)2
2𝜍2 ,𝑥 > 0 
 The MLE estimators for the parameters are 𝜇 =  
1
𝑛
 log 𝑥𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  for the location parameter and 
𝜍2 =  
1
𝑛
 (log𝑥𝑗 − 𝜇 )
2𝑛
𝑗 =1  for the scale parameter.  The random variates can be generated using the 
inverse transform method by 𝑋 =  𝑒𝜙
−1 𝑈 𝜍+ 𝜇 , where 𝜙 is the standard normal distribution. 
 
                                                             
36 Log denotes the natural logarithm 
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2.4.2.3 Gamma distribution 
 
 The gamma distribution is a generalization of an exponential distribution with a density function 
in the form of: 
𝑓 𝑥 =  𝑥𝛼−1
𝑒
−𝑥
𝛽
βαΓ 𝛼 
, 𝑥,𝛼,𝛽 > 0, 
where Γ(a) denotes a complete gamma function characterized by Γ 𝑎 =   𝑡𝑎−1𝑒−𝑡𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 , 𝛼 is the shape 
and 𝛽 is the scale parameter.  The MLE estimates for the parameters can only be evaluated numerically 
because no close form exists37.  
 The random variates can be generated using 𝑋 =  −
1
𝛽
log( 𝑈𝑗 )
𝛼
𝑗=1  , where 𝑈𝑗  are independent 
uniform random variables.38 
  
2.4.2.4 Weibull distribution 
 
 The Weibull distribution is also based on the exponential distribution. The Weibull distribution 
has two parameters - 𝛼 is the shape parameter and 𝛽 is the scale parameter - that allow for better tail 
modeling. The density function has the following form:  
𝑓 𝑥 =  
𝛼
𝛽
(
𝑥
𝛽
)𝛼−1𝑒
−(
𝑥
𝛽
)𝛼  
,𝑥, 𝛼, 𝛽 > 0 
 The MLE estimates can again be computed only numerically. To generate Weibull random 
variables one can use the following relation 𝑋 =  𝛽(− log𝑈)
1
𝛼 , where 𝑈 is a uniform random variable 
from interval (0,1). For 𝛼 < 1  the distribution is very heavy tailed, which makes it suitable for 
reinsurance models.39 
 
2.4.2.5 G&h distribution 
 
 The g&h distribution is the most advanced parametric distribution that will be used in this paper. 
It is “a strictly increasing transformation of the standard normal distribution 𝑍 defined by: 
                                                             
37 In this case statistical software R will be used 
38 This holds only if 𝛼 is an integer (Chernobai 2007) 
39 Chernobai (2007) 
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𝑋𝑔 ,𝑕 𝑍 = 𝐴 +
𝐵
𝑔
 𝑒𝑔𝑍 − 1 𝑒
1
2𝑕𝑍
2
, 
where A, B, g and h  ≥ 0 are the four parameters of the distribution.”40 
 The parameters are estimated using the following algorithm. 𝐴  is equal to median of the data 
sample 𝑋0,5.  The 𝑔  parameter is defined as a median of 𝑔𝑝 =  − 
1
𝑍𝑝
 log(
𝑋1−𝑝− 𝑋0,5
𝑋0,5 − 𝑋𝑝
) where 𝑋𝑝  is the 𝑝
𝑡𝑕  
percentile of g-distribution and 𝑍𝑝  is the 𝑝
𝑡𝑕  of standard normal distribution. The other two parameters 
are determined using the OLS regression of log (UHS) on 𝑍𝑝
2/2, where UHS is an upper half spread41 
defined as 𝑈𝐻𝑆 =  
𝑔(𝑋1−𝑝− 𝑋0,5)
𝑒−𝑔𝑍𝑝− 1
. The 𝐵  is estimated as the exponentiated value of the intercept of this 
regression and the 𝑕  is estimated as the coefficient of that regression. 
 Random variates are then generated using the form for 𝑋𝑔 ,𝑕 𝑍 . Please note, that some other 
distributions can be expressed using the g&h distributions for a specific value of its four parameters. 
Because of the specific tail behavior, the g&h distribution might fit the OR data considerably well. 
 
2.4.3 Extreme value theory 
 
The EVT is a branch of statistics that is focused on the study of extreme phenomena – the rare 
events that are situated in a tail of a particular probability distribution. Based on the knowledge of OR 
data distribution, it is assumable that the EVT would be an ideal tool for OR capital charge estimation.  
There are several techniques for the EVT – each of them uses different method to pick up the low 
frequency/high severity loss events. They differ in the way how they set a threshold to cut loss data 
distribution into two parts – the body and the tail. Under the EVT, the body is being modeled using a 
different method (e.g. empirical sampling) and the tails are being modeled using specific EVT methods. 
The EVT relies on a sufficiently large data sample. This is not always the case for OR data, therefore the 
results can be biased.  
 
2.4.3.1 Block maxima method 
 
The block maxima method (BMM) divides data into independent blocks of the same size.42  The 
data selection model is shown on figure 2.2. The block maxima model would be useful, if the extreme 
events were equally distributed over the whole time interval. This is not usually the case. 
                                                             
40 Dutta, Perry (2007) 
41 This part of spread is relevant for operational risk data because they are right skewed 
42
 E.g. a one month period 
Operational Risk - Scenario Analysis                                   Milan Rippel  
 
29 Rigorous Thesis 
 
Figure 2.2 - Block maxima model 
 
 Source: Teply, Chalupka (2007) 
“For very large extreme loss observation x, the limiting distribution of such normalized maxima is 
the Generalized extreme value (GEV).”43 The probability density distribution function of GEV distribution 
has a form of:44 
𝑓 𝑥;  𝜇, 𝜍, 𝜉 =  
1
𝜍
[1 +  𝜉  
𝑥−𝜇
𝜍
 ]
−1 𝜉 − 1𝑒−[1+𝜉 
𝑥−𝜇
𝜍
 ]
−1 𝜉 
  for 1 +  𝜉  
𝑥−𝜇
𝜍
 > 0, 
where x refers to block maxima observations, 𝜇 ∈ 𝑅  is the location parameter,  𝜍 > 0  is the 
scale parameter and  𝜉  is the shape parameter. The GEV is supported under these conditions: 
𝑥 >  𝜇 −  
𝜍
𝜉
  if 𝜉 > 0 
𝑥 <  𝜇 −  
𝜍
𝜉
  if 𝜉 < 0 
𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 if 𝜉 = 0 
The GEV distribution can be divided into three cases based on the value of the shape 
parameter.45  The most important case called  the Fréchet or the type II extreme value (EV) distribution is 
for 𝜉 > 0. The tail of the Fréchet distribution is slowly varying and thus suitable for modeling high 
severity OR data. The other two cases (the Gumbel or the type I EV distribution for 𝜉 = 0 and the 
Weibull or the type III EV distribution for 𝜉 < 0) are of a less importance for OR data modeling because 
they do not fit the tail as well as in the Fréchet case. 
Teply, Chalupka (2008) further details parameter estimation methods for the GEV distribution 
using the probability-weighted moments (PWM). A GEV random variate can be simulated using the 
                                                             
43 Chernobai (2007) 
44 For more details see Embrechts (2005), Teply, Chalupka (2008), Chernobai (2007) 
45 Teply, Chalupka (2008) 
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inverse transform method 𝑋 =  𝜇 −  𝜍 (1 − log 𝑈)−𝜉) 𝜉 , where U is distributed uniformly on (0,1) 
interval.46 
 
2.4.3.2 Peak over threshold method 
 
 The peak over threshold method (POTM) logic is shown on figure 2.3. This method uses all 
observations that exceed certain high threshold level. As argued by Embrechts (2005), these models are 
more frequently used in practice for OR exposure measurement. 
Figure 2.3 – Peak over threshold model 
 
 Source: Teply, Chalupka (2007) 
 The limiting distribution for the POTM is the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) with the 
probability density function in the form of: 
𝑓 𝑥; 𝜉,𝜇,𝜍 =  
1
𝜍
(1 + 
𝜉(𝑥−𝜇 )
𝜍
)
(−
1
𝜉
−1)
  , 
where x refers to the data exceeding the threshold,    𝜇 ∈ 𝑅  is the location parameter,47  𝜍 > 0  
is the scale parameter and  𝜉  is the shape parameter. GPD is supported under these conditions: 
𝑥 ≥  𝜇 if 𝜉 ≥ 0 
𝜇 ≤ 𝑥 ≤  𝜇 −  
𝜍
𝜉
 if 𝜉 < 0 
 Similarly to the GEV, also the GPD has special cases based on the value of the shape parameter. 
The most important case from OR modeling point of view is when 𝜉 > 0.48 In this case the GPD has very 
heavy tails.  
                                                             
46 This form holds when 𝜉 ≠ 0 
47 The location parameter is usually assumed to be 0 which reduces number of parameters to two 
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 The GPD parameters can be again estimated by using either the MLE or the PWM methods – for 
more details see Teply, Chalupka (2008).  A GDP random variate can be simulated by using the inverse 
transform method in the form of 𝑋 =  𝜇 − 𝜍 (1 − 𝑈−𝜉) 𝜉 .49 
 A critical task for designing the GPD distribution is to set an appropriate threshold level. This 
level should be set to be sufficiently high to fit extreme events. But on the other hand, the filtered data 
sample should not be limited too much in order to provide reasonable statistical evidence. Several 
approaches to solve this optimization task exist. The most commonly used one relies on “the visual 
observation of the mean excess plot,”50 which is defined as the mean of all differences between the 
values of the data exceeding threshold level u and u. In case of the GPD the empirical mean excess 
function can be formalized into the following equation: 
𝑒𝑛  𝑣 =  
  𝑥𝑗 −  𝑣 𝐼(𝑣 <  𝑥𝑗 )
𝑛
𝑗=1
 𝐼(𝑣 <  𝑥𝑗 )
𝑛
𝑗=1
=  
𝛽
1 −  𝜉
+ 
𝜉
1 −  𝜉
𝑢 
where v is the value above threshold level u. “Threshold values against mean excess values provide the 
mean excess plot. If the data supports a GPD model, then this plot should become increasingly linear for 
higher values of v “51. A general practice is then to choose such u for which the mean excess plot is 
roughly linear. 
 Several other approaches for choosing the threshold exist – the most simple one is just to define 
the right tail as five or ten percent of the largest observations. 
  
2.4.3.3 Estimation of the shape parameter 𝝃 for GEV and GPD 
 
 Because of a low number of extreme observations that can be used for the POTM or the BMM, 
the MLE for the shape parameter 𝜉 may by biased.52 Nonparametric estimation methods can be used as 
a workaround for this problem: The Hill estimator and the Pickands estimator. But both of these 
methods require large number of extreme events observations.53  Even though it might be beneficial to 
use those estimates together with the PWM method because they all concentrate on the tail events, 
while MLE method treats all the observation with an equal weight.   
 The formula for the Hill estimator is given as: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
48 The GPD in this case is a reparameterized Pareto distribution (Chernobai 2007) 
49 In the case when 𝜉 ≠ 0 
50 Chernobai (2007) 
51 Based on Teply, Chalupka (2008) 
52 Chernobai (2007) 
53 The Pickands estimator requires even larger number of observations, therefore we will further focus only on the 
Hill estimator 
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𝜉 𝐻 =  
1
𝑘
 log 𝑋𝑗 −  log 𝐻𝑘
𝑘
𝑗=1
 
 The optimal value of 𝜉 𝐻  is then computed using visual observation of the Hill plot – the 
optimality condition is when the curve of the Hill estimator values becomes flat. 
 
2.5 Goodness of fit tests 
 
 The fit of distributions chosen should be tested by a set of goodness of fit tests (GOFT) in order 
to avoid model risk – risk of choosing bad distribution for the LDA approach. “An underestimated VaR 
would jeopardize the long-term ability of a bank to maintain a sufficient amount of capital reserves to 
protect against catastrophic operational losses, while a severely overestimated VaR would limit the 
amount of funds available for investment.”54 In order to determine optimality of the chosen model, a 
combination of GOFTs must be used. 
 There are two ways how to assess the GOFT – either by using in-sample GOFTs or backtesting.  
Backtesting is the opposite approach to stress testing which questions validity of a chosen model. Since 
backtesting is beyond the scope of this rigorous thesis, we will focus on in-sample GOFTs further on. 
They are divided into two classes – visual tests and formal tests.  
 
2.5.1 Visual GOFTs 
 
 Visual GOFTs compare empirical and hypothesized distributions by plotting them to a chart and 
comparing their characteristics. One of the tests is the mean excess plot. 
 The most commonly used visual test is Quantile-Quantile (QQ) plot which plots empirical data 
sample quantiles against the quantiles of the distribution that is being tested for fit. If such a distribution 
fits the data well then the QQ-plot would follow a 450 line. The QQ plot is especially important in case of 
small sample sizes. “The reason is that as the sample size shrinks, formal statistical tests become more 
likely to fail to reject the fit of a distribution.”55 
 
                                                             
54 Chernobai (2007) 
55 Dutta, Perry (2007) 
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2.5.2 Formal GOFTs 
  
 Formal GOFTs test whether the data sample follows a hypothesized distribution. The null and the 
alternative hypothesis are stated as:56 
   H0 : The data sample follows the specified distribution 
   H1 : The data sample does not follow the specified distribution  
 Because of the OR the data specifics, the tests that are based on empirical distribution 
function57are adequate measures for testing the GOF of particular distribution for OR loss severity 
modeling. The common chi-square based tests rely on large sample size. The output of these tests might 
be biased because of the limited sample size of the data provided by BANK. 
  “Empirical distribution function-based tests directly compare the empirical distribution function 
with the fitted distribution function.”58  The tests belonging to this group are the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test, the Kuiper test and the Anderson-Darling test. 
 
2.5.2.1Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
 
 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test is a supremum based test. The test statistic is based on the 
largest vertical difference between the empirical cumulative distribution function 𝐹𝑛(𝑥)  and the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the fitted distribution 𝐹(𝑥). Mathematically the KS statistic is 
calculated as: 
𝐾𝑆 =  
𝑠𝑢𝑝
𝑥
|𝐹𝑛 𝑥 −  𝐹 𝑥 |  
 The computing formula for KS statistic is expressed as follows:59 
𝐾𝑆 =  max  
𝑠𝑢𝑝
𝑗
 (
𝑗
𝑛
− 𝑧 𝑗  ),
𝑠𝑢𝑝
𝑗 (𝑧 𝑗  −
  
𝑗 − 1
𝑛
)  
 where 𝑧(𝑗) = 𝐹 𝑥 𝑗   , 𝑗 = 1,2,… ,𝑛;  𝑥 1 <  𝑥 2 < ⋯ <  𝑥 𝑛 . The test output is then compared with 
critical values of the Kolmogorov distribution. 
                                                             
56 Chernobai (2007) 
57 An empirical distribution function is a cumulative distribution function that concentrates probability 1 𝑛  at each 
n observations in a sample 
58 Chernobai (2007) 
59 For more details on definition of the computing formula see Chernobai (2007) 
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 The KS statistic has some important drawbacks.60 It is only usable for continuous distributions. It 
is more sensitive to deviations in the center rather than to deviations in the tails. And if the fitted 
distribution contains shape parameter then the critical value of the KS needs to be simulated. 
 
2.5.2.2 Kuiper test 
 
 The Kuiper test is a modification of the KS test. It sums the largest differences between the EDF 
and the fitted CDF and conversely. The test statistic is calculated as: 
 𝑉 =  (
𝑠𝑢𝑝
𝑥
 𝐹𝑛 𝑥 −  𝐹 𝑥  +
𝑠𝑢𝑝
𝑥
 𝐹 𝑥 −  𝐹𝑛 𝑥   
 The computing formula is: 
𝑉 =   
𝑠𝑢𝑝
𝑗 (
 𝑗
𝑛
− 𝑧(𝑗)) + 
𝑠𝑢𝑝
𝑗 (𝑧 𝑗  −
  
𝑗 − 1
𝑛
)  
 
 
2.5.2.3 Anderson-Darling test 
 
 The Anderson-Darling (AD) test puts more weight on the tails of the distributions and thus it 
might be more suitable for the purpose of OR data modeling where one is supposed to deal with heavy 
tails. The quadratic AD test statistics is: 
𝐴𝐷2 = 𝑛 
(𝐹𝑛 𝑥 − 𝐹(𝑥))
2
𝐹(𝑥)(1 − 𝐹 𝑥 )
𝑑𝐹(𝑥)
∞
−∞
 
 The computing formula for quadratic form of the AD test is expressed as follows:61  
𝐴𝐷2 =  −𝑛 +
1
𝑛
  1 − 2𝑗 log(𝑧 𝑗  ) −  
1
𝑛
  1 + 2 𝑛 − 𝑗  log(1 − 𝑧 𝑗  )
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
 Different critical values must be used for each null distribution of the AD test which makes it 
more sensitive to the null distribution than the KS or the Kuiper tests . 
 
                                                             
60 Dutta, Perry (2007) 
61 The quadratic form will be used below 
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2.6 Aggregate loss distribution and capital charge estimates 
 
 Once the frequency and severity loss distributions are evaluated, an aggregated risk exposure of 
the bank should be estimated. Both types of distributions are to be aggregated to a single model which 
estimates the total loss over a one-year period. The measure used for the estimation of required capital 
charge is the Value-at- risk (VaR). “In the context of operational risk, VaR is the total one-year amount of 
capital that would be sufficient to cover all unexpected losses with a high level of confidence.”62 
 
2.6.1 Aggregate loss distribution 
 
Figure 2.4: Aggregation of operational loss and frequency distributions 
 
 Source: Samad-Khan (2006) 
 According to Chernobai (2007), simple actuarial type models are used to aggregate the severity 
and frequency distributions into one single model. This method relies on the following assumptions: 
                                                             
62 Chernobai (2007). 
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 Loss amounts are independent from each other and are identically distributed positive 
random variables 
 Conditional on the given total number of loss events n, the distribution of the loss 
amounts is independent from n 
 The distribution of the total number of loss events does not depend on the loss amounts 
 The aggregation process is shown on figure 2.4. Mathematical derivation of the aggregate loss 
distribution function is further discussed in Chernobai (2007).   
 Due to the fact that the cumulative distribution function is not linear in X nor in N, analytic 
expressions for the compound distribution function do not exist and thus the function must be evaluated 
numerically. The most common technique relies on numerical approximation of the compound 
distribution function using the Monte Carlo simulations of loss scenarios. The algorithm is as follows:63 
i. Simulate a large number of Poisson random variates and obtain a sequence n1, n2, … nMC 
representing scenarios of the total number of loss events in a one-year period. 
ii. For each of such scenarios nk simulate nk number of loss amounts using a specified loss severity 
distribution 
iii. For each of such scenarios nk  sum the loss amounts obtained in the previous step in order to 
obtain cumulative one-year losses 
iv. Sort the sequence obtained in the last step to obtain the desired aggregate loss distribution 
 The number of simulated observations differ. A minimum number of simulations that is 
considered to be statistically representative is 10,000. Due to the very high VaR confidence levels, 50,000 
simulations will be used for the more advanced distributions and for scenario analysis in this rigorous 
thesis. 
 
2.6.2 VaR 
 
 “VaR determines the worst possible loss that may occur with a given confidence level and for a 
given timeframe.”64 In case of OR VaR is also a measure for capital adequacy requirement defined by 
Basel II using a high confidence level, such as 99.9% and a one-year period. Thus under the LDA the VaR 
can be estimated as a corresponding percentile of the aggregated loss distribution. 
                                                             
63 Chernobai (2007) 
64 Chernobai (2007) 
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 Many empirical studies show that in case of OR only few rare events account for the major part 
of the VaR.65 Because of that even while using a high confidence level such as 99.9%, the VaR measures 
would not be able to account for extreme loses. And so the VaR can be used for estimation of required 
capital charge but not for estimation of required economic capital.66 Other pitfalls of the VaR are 
discussed in Chernobai (2007) – the most important one is that the VaR fails a subadditivity property67 
and so a sum of VaR across different business lined can overestimate the required capital charge.  
 Because of those facts, alternative risk measures, which are able to account even for extreme 
events, were designed. The most common one is the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) – also known as 
the Expected Tail Loss or Expected Shortfall. The concept of the VaR and the CVaR is shown on Figure 
2.5. “CVaR determines the amount of money one is expected to lose if an event in the right tail of the 
distribution beyond VaR takes place.”68 In case of OR modeling CVaR is the corresponding percentile of a 
right tail aggregate loss distribution, where right tail is defined as a 1 - confidence level used for the VaR. 
Figure 2.5: Concept of VaR and CVaR 
 
 Source: Chernobai (2007) 
 The CVaR thus better captures tail events and can provide better measure of economic capital. 
While using EVT methods, the VaR measure can be used for the body and the CVaR for the tail of the 
aggregate loss distribution. On the other hand in presence of very extreme events the results obtained 
by the CVaR might be unrealistically high and thus not feasible for OR management. The median tail loss 
method can be used instead – this method relies on computing median of tail observations that lie 
beyond the VaR focus.  
                                                             
65 Ebnother, Vanini, McNeil, Antolinez-Fehr (2001) 
66 See chapter 1.4 for more details on economic capital 
67 Subadditivity property: 𝜌 𝑋1 − 𝑋2 ≤  𝜌 𝑋1) + 𝜌(𝑋2  
68 Chernobai (2007) 
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 Chapter 3 - Empirical data sample analysis 
 
 This chapter applies theoretical approaches discussed in the previous chapter to the OR data 
sample provided by BANK and evaluates the results of regulatory and economic capital estimates as well 
as appropriateness of a particular statistical distribution for model OR data.  
 
3.1 Data classification and empirical distribution 
 
 The data sample provided by BANK consists of 657 loss events registered between 26th March 
2003 and 17th April 200769.  Several corrections and assumptions were made about the data sample. 
 
3.1.1 Assumptions 
 
 The following assumptions about the data sample were made: 
 Observations are registered according to loss registration and not OR event occurrence date 
 The base currency (EUR) is used 
 Exchange rate and inflation impacts are not considered, nominal values in EUR are used 
 The data sample is truncated from below, but the threshold is set to a very low value,70 so we do 
not use corrections for left truncation bias 
 In order to have complete four years sample (4/2003-4/2007), two loss events registered in the 
year 2001 were excluded from the analysis 
 Also seventeen other loss events were excluded from the data sample because they have no 
registered loss amount 
 The impact of insurance is not considered – neither from the time or magnitude points of view – 
because only the actual loss amount is important for a financial institution 
 The business line and event type classification defined by BANK is used – this classification differs 
from the one set by Basel II in some aspects (four business lines instead of eight) 
 Only internal loss data are used and thus estimates provided by using the LDA might be 
underestimated because no external loss data were employed71 
                                                             
69 Some events were excluded from the original sample – see assumptions section for more details 
70 The threshold level is set to app. EUR 300, which is significantly less than the threshold typically used by foreign 
banks – according to several papers (Dutta, Perry (2007), Chernobai (2007), de Fountnouvelle (2003), the typical 
threshold level is set to $10,000 and the left truncation correction methods must be used 
71 It was not technically possible to be provided with an access to some external data database 
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 While the SA approach uses 15% of gross income as a regulatory capital charge it might be 
assumed that by using the LDA approach the reasonable interval for capital charge estimates is 
5-15% 
 
3.1.2 Data sample statistics 
 
Table 3.1: Data sample statistics – whole sample 
Mean Median Std. deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
41,738 3,114 280,538 14 225 
 Source: BANK data sample 
 The common statistics for the whole sample (Table 3.1) show a significant difference between 
the mean and the median and a very high standard deviation which signals a heavy right tail. The same 
information is given by the skewness measure – its positive value signals that right tail contains more 
data than in case of normal distribution. The high value of the kurtosis measure signals that the high 
standard deviation is caused by infrequent extreme observations.  
Table 3.2: Data sample statistics – lower 90% of the losses 
Mean 
 
Median Std. deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
6,242 2,143 8,913 2 4 
 Source: BANK data sample 
 If 10% of the largest loss events are not considered, then the data sample statistics change 
significantly and exhibit relative similarities with normal distribution. The skewness and the kurtosis 
measures decrease to a low value, which means that there are not many extreme observations anymore 
and that the distribution is a relatively symmetric one. Those 10% of the largest losses account for 97% 
of variance in the data sample and cause an upward bias in the vital statistics. Chernobai (2007) suggests 
to use robust statistics methods for the LDA, where extreme observations are excluded from the analysis 
and body of the distribution is modeled using classical statistical methods. This approach is however 
beyond the focus of this paper. 
 The empirical data distribution exhibits a heavy right tail. This fact can be assessed by using one 
of the explanatory data analysis methods suggested by Dutta, Perry (2007). They suggest to measure 
skewness of the data sample by using a mid-summary approach. If the data are symmetric, then the mid-
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summary, defined as 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝 =
1
2
(𝑋𝑝 + 𝑋1−𝑝), equals to the median of the data for all percentiles p.
72 This 
“a plot of  𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝  vs. 1-p is useful in determining whether there is a systematic skewness of the data.”
73 
Figure 3.1: Plot of mid-summaries to percentiles 
 
 Source: Author based on BANK data sample 
 The mid-summaries curve is plotted on Figure 3.1. It significantly diverges from the median for 
percentiles higher than 90%. This proves that the data sample exhibits severe right skewness. So those 
distributions which are able to sufficiently model such a right tail must be used for loss severity 
distribution modeling in order to achieve appropriate goodness of fit. 
 
3.1.3 Empirical loss frequency 
 
 As mentioned above, the data sample consists of full four years of observations from 4/2003 to 
4/2007.  
 The observations from a month in a year are summed over the four-year period as shown on 
Figure 3.2. The observations are not distributed evenly over the months in a year because of the data 
collection mechanism. This issue can be easily solved by modeling each month separately using a Poisson 
distribution, so the overall results should not be impacted by this inequality. 
                                                             
72 𝑋𝑝and 𝑋1−𝑝  denotes p-th and (1-p)-th percentiles of the data sample 
73 Dutta, Perry (2007) 
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of loss  observations over months in a year (number/month) 
 
 Source: BANK data sample 
 
3.1.4 Business lines & event types classification 
 
 Even though the biggest attention is devoted to the data analysis and the capital estimation 
process on the institutional level, it should be also mentioned that differences between the empirical 
loss observations exist on both business line and event type levels, both in the number of events and the 
average loss in a particular category.  
 
3.1.5 Economic results of BANK 
 
 According to the implementary regulations set by ČNB in the ammendment to EU Directive 
2006/48/EC, the gross income does not include operating expenses, provisions and also outsourcing 
services.  
 The result (in EUR millions) is then used as a benchmark to compare capital adequacy ratios 
estimated using loss severity distributions listed in chapter 2.74  
 
                                                             
74 Frequency distribution is modeled using the Poisson process 
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3.2 LDA results on a company level 
 
 The procedure described in chapter 2.6.1 was used to aggregate the loss frequency and the loss 
severity distributions. The Monte Carlo simulation method is used for the parameter estimation as well 
as for the aggregation function. In those cases, where a generally lower fit is expected, 10,000 trials are 
simulated. For distributions where a better fit is expected, 50,000 trials are simulated in order to achieve 
higher statistical relevance while working with such a high confidence level of the VaR and the CVaR 
measures. Some of the estimated parameters were computed by using the R-software75 or the EasyFitXL 
Excel plug-in76 or by using the direct computation method in MS Excel. The MLE or the MOM method is 
used. Three VaR measures are provided – 99% VaR, 99.9% VaR, which is used as a required capital 
charge estimate defined by Basel II, and also 99% CVaR measure which is used as an economic capital 
estimate. The capital estimates are then related to gross income of BANK. The loss distributions that do 
not fit the data sample very well will not be further used during the stress testing. 
 The fit of the distributions to the sample data is evaluated by using the QQ plot, the KS and the 
AD tests.77 The test values are compared with the critical values for the KS and the AD tests which are 
listed in Table 3.3. If the test statistics are higher than the critical value, then the null hypothesis that the 
particular distribution is able to model the OR data sample cannot be rejected. 
Table 3.3: Critical values for KS and AD GOFT for the sample78 
Test 0.1 0.05 0.01 
KS 0.0477 0.0529 0.0635 
AD 1.9286 2.5018 3.9074 
 Source: EasyFitXL 
 
3.2.1 Loss frequency distributions 
 
 Since the loss events are not distributed equally over months in a year, each month is being 
modeled separately by the Poisson distribution. The MLE estimate of the intensity rate 𝜆  is set as an 
average number of events per particular month divided by number of years. In case of BANK data 
                                                             
75 http://www.r-project.org/  
76 http://www.mathwave.com/products/easyfit.html  
77 Except for the g&h distribution, where just QQ plot is used 
78 Note, that the critical values depend on the distribution used and also on the number of observations in a 
sample, so the numbers listed apply just to the specific case of the full BANK data sample 
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sample, the value of the estimated parameter corresponds to the one fourth of the number of events 
per month in a year on Figure 3.2. 
 
3.2.2 Loss severity empirical sampling 
 
 The Empirical sampling method (ESM) relies on the VaR estimation based on a generation of 
large number of loss severity events that are randomly drawn from an empirical data sample using the 
MC method. Since the algorithm for choosing a particular item from a data sample tends to put the 
equal probability to both high and low severity events it might be rightly assumed that the VaR0.999 
measure would be quite low for this method. And thus a bank would not be able to use this method by 
its own in order to compute reasonable regulatory capital estimates. On the other hand, this method is 
very useful to modeling the body of the empirical data sample, while the tail is being modeled using a 
different, EVT type model – more details about this approach is given below. Because of the fact that the 
ESM does not use any statistical distribution, the GOFTs cannot be done. 
 Two ESMs were used – the first one considers the whole data sample, while the second one 
considers just those observations with the loss amount higher than EUR 1,000. The reason for the second 
method was already mentioned above – most of the banks use higher loss amount thresholds than BANK 
does and so the very low severity events might decrease regulatory capital estimate which is intended to 
focus especially on high impact events. 
Table 3.4: ESM estimates 
ESM type Whole sample EUR 1,000+ sample 
Cap. estimate/Gross income 2.31% 2.92% 
 Source: Author 
 The capital estimates provided by both ESMs comply with the assumptions stated above – the 
overall result is quite low and thus the ESM itself might not be considered as a credible AMA method 
that would be approved by a regulator, because it underestimates required capital charge. 
 
3.2.3 Loss severity parametric distributions  
 
 The distributions discussed in chapter 2.4 are used to fit the empirical loss severity data. The test 
statistics, parameter estimates and the economic and regulatory capital estimates are commented and 
evaluated from both economical and statistical points of view.  
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3.2.3.1 Exponential distribution 
 
 The exponential distribution exhibits a very poor fit to the data sample that has a heavy right tail. 
Both the KS and the AD null hypothesis are rejected on any conventional confidence level. The QQ plot 
suggests the very same conclusion – empirical quantiles are of a significantly larger magnitude than 
estimated ones, what result in a downward slope of the QQ plot curve. 
Table 3.5 Exponential distribution statistics 
𝝀  2.3959E-5 
KS 0.52544  
AD2 572.13 
Cap. estimate/Gross income 0.95% 
 Source: Author 
 There is not a significant difference between the VaR0.99 and the CVaR0.99 measures, thus the 
right tail is not very long under the exponential distribution. The capital estimate obtained by 
exponential distribution gives very low results, which means that the exponential distribution is not a 
suitable distribution for the stress testing purposes. 
 
Figure 3.3: QQ plot for exponential distribution79
 
 Source: Author 
                                                             
79The quantiles are measured in millions of Euros  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 2 4 6
Es
ti
m
at
ed
 Q
u
an
ti
le
s
Empirical quantiles
Operational Risk - Scenario Analysis                                   Milan Rippel  
 
45 Rigorous Thesis 
 
 
3.2.3.2 Lognormal distribution 
 
 The lognormal distribution provides better fit than the exponential distribution. The KS test can 
still be rejected on any conventional confidence level up to the 99.99% but the test statistics value is 
significantly lower than in case of the exponential distribution and thus the tail is fitted little better, 
however still not sufficiently. 
Table 3.6: Lognormal distribution statistics 
𝝁  8.2246 
𝜍  1.8208 
KS 0.0872 
AD2 9.2307 
Cap. estimate/Gross income 1.49% 
 Source: Author 
Figure 3.4: QQ plot for lognormal distribution 
 
 Source: Author 
 The QQ plot for the lognormal distribution suggests a moderate fit to the empirical distribution. 
The difference between the VaR0.99  and the CVaR0.99 measures is significant, so that the right tail of the 
estimated distribution is moderately long. But the estimated regulatory capital value is just 1.5% of the 
gross income which is unrealistically low. Because of these reasons, the lognormal distribution does not 
seem to be suitable for the modeling OR data and thus it will not be used for stress testing purposes. 
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3.2.3.3 Gamma distribution 
 
 The gamma distribution provides results that are similar to the Weibull and to the exponential 
distribution,  including the CVaR and the VaR measures. All GOFTs can be rejected on any conventional 
significance level which suggests that the gamma distribution is not fitting the empirical data very well 
neither. 
Table 3.7: Gamma distribution statistics 
𝜶  0.2879 
𝛽  144,980 
KS 0.2162 
 
AD2 66.1629 
 
Cap. estimate/Gross income 1.12% 
 Source: Author 
Figure 3.5: QQ plot for gamma distribution
 
 Source: Author 
 The QQ plot for gamma distributions shows just the same – the empirical quantiles are much 
higher than the estimated ones. The capital estimate is very low, meaning that the gamma distribution 
would underestimate required capital charge and so it is not suitable to model the BANK data sample. 
 
3.2.3.4 Weibull distribution 
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 The Weibull distribution provides poor fit to the empirical data. Even though the KS and the AD2 
statistics get better results than in case of exponential distribution, still the null hypothesis can be 
rejected on any significance level – so the Weibull distribution does not match the empirical distribution. 
The VaR and the CVaR measures are very low and the overall capital estimate is the lowest one among 
all of the loss severity distributions used for the analysis. 
Table 3.8: Weibull distribution statistics 
𝜶  0.4682 
𝛽  9,839 
KS 0.1784 
 
AD2 23.0713 
Cap. estimate/Gross income 0.69% 
 Source: Author 
Figure 3.6: QQ plot for Weibull distribution 
 
 Source: Author 
 The QQ plot for the Weibull distribution exhibits poor fit to the empirical distribution and the 
capital estimate is very low, which signals that the Weibull distribution is not suitable to model the right 
tail with a sufficient statistical significance.  
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3.2.3.5 G&h distribution 
 
Table 3.9: G&h distribution statistics 
𝑨  3,113 
𝐵  6,197 
𝑔  2.0747 
𝑕  0.0545 
Cap. estimate/Gross income 4.43% 
 Source: Author 
 Due to the fact that the g&h CDF is unknown,80 the KS and the AD GOFTs were not computed. 
The statistical fit is measured just visually by using the QQ plot. The g&h distribution provides the most 
reasonable results in terms of capital estimate among all parametric distributions. Even though the 
capital charge is still underestimated (4.4%) as is clear from the QQ plot, the fit to the empirical data is 
much better than for all other parametric distributions. The value of the VaR0.99 measure is more than 
five times lower than the value of CVaR0.99 measure, supposed the g&h is able to model the very heavy 
right tail and can fit even the extreme loss events. The economic capital estimate which the bank is 
required to hold in order to stay in business, might be significantly higher than the capital charge 
required by Basel II, which corresponds with our assumptions.  
Figure 3.7: QQ plot for g&h distribution 
 
 Source: Author 
                                                             
80 Headrick (2008) 
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 Because of these features the g&h distribution can be considered as sufficiently suitable for 
modeling the OR data and will be used further in this paper. The fact that the capital estimate is lower 
than the expected one can be explained by lack of extreme observations in the limited data sample. If 
there were more loss events in the data sample – e.g. external ones – the g&h distribution would then 
provide even better result. Therefore so this distribution might be evaluated as a very suitable one to 
model the OR data. 
 
3.2.4 Loss severity EVT approach 
 
 The two EVT approaches described in chapter 2.4 were used to model the right tail of the data 
sample – the BMM and the POTM. The body was modeled using the ESM explained above – because the 
extreme events were not considered for the ESM, this method sounds reasonable for the EVT approach. 
The following section contains the parameter estimates and the test statistics of the distribution used for 
the tail modeling  and also for the overall capital estimates. The critical values of the KS and the AD tests 
change as the number of observations in the sample changes and so p-values of those tests are provided. 
The EasyFitXL software was used for the parameter estimation and the MC method. In order to achieve 
better statistical relevance in a situation with limited empirical sample, 50,000 trials were used for the 
MC. The loss aggregation algorithm described in section 2.6.1 was slightly modified, because the random 
events were generated by two methods – the ESM and the EVT. The total one-year loss is then a sum of 
the loss events generated by the ESM and the loss events generated by the EVT.   
 It should be noted, that the KS and the AD test null hypothesis significantly differs from the one 
for parametric distributions because only the tail of the data is now modeled and not the whole data 
sample. Thus better statistical fit can be expected because of the lower number of observations and 
relatively lower variance, skewness and kurtosis measures. So the higher the threshold for the POTM or 
the longer the period for BMM method, the lower number of observations are used for particular EVT 
method – which has an advantage of generally better statistical fit but, on the other hand, it might bring 
some bias. The conclusion is that GOFT results are not comparable with each other because the null 
hypothesis  differs. The parameter estimates depend very heavily on the number of observations in the 
tail of the data. Large discrepancies exists if the original loss database is merged with the loss events 
defined in a scenario. This issue will be discussed in more details in chapter 5. 
 
3.2.4.1 EVT – Block maxima method 
 
 Two approaches for the BMM were used – they differ in the length of period used for the block 
maxima. The first one uses a month period, thus the total number of observations shrinks to 48. But still 
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large discrepancies exist among these observations, which might lead to the overestimation of the 
capital charge. And so the second approach considers just the maximum observations per quarter. The 
number of observations further reduces to 16 but the differences between those observations are not as 
significant as in the previous case. Furthermore increasing the period would impose a bias on the 
parameter estimates, because the number of observations would be too low.   
 In both cases the GEV distribution was used to fit the extreme events. The shape parameter 
𝜉  estimates were positive in both cases, which corresponds with the assumptions that the OR data will fit 
the Fréchet type GEV distribution. Because of the relatively limited sample, advanced methods for the 
shape parameter estimation might be employed – namely the Hill’s estimator discussed above. 
Table 3.10: Block maxima – Max per month GEV statistics81 
𝝁  47,202 
𝜍  78,284 
 
𝜉  0.7746 
 
KS 0.1288 (0.37) 
AD2 1.1055 (0.25) 
Cap. estimate/Gross income 14.95% 
 Source: Author 
Figure 3.8: QQ plot for BMM – Max per month 
 
  Source: Author 
 The Max each month method provides much better fit to the tail of the data than any of the 
parametric distributions discussed so far. Neither the KS nor the AD GOFTs can be rejected even on 80% 
                                                             
81 The numbers in brackets denote the p-value of particular test. The same applies to all tables with the EVT type 
statistics 
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significance level. And so those GOFTs together with the QQ plot82 prove, that the GEV distribution fits 
the empirical distribution of the tail quite well – but it might not fit the body of the data, so the test 
statistics are not comparable with the parametric distributions approach. 
 The data generated by the Max per month BMM exhibit a very heavy right tail – as can be seen 
from the tremendous difference between the VaR0.99 and the CVaR0.99 measures. The capital estimate 
provided by this method is quite high and almost equals the capital charge level used by the SA 
approach. So even though the method is suitable from the statistical point of view, it will not be used 
further in this paper, because it overestimates the capital charge83. 
Table 3.11: Block maxima – Max per quarter GEV statistics 
𝝁  235,394 
 
𝜍  376,549 
 
𝜉  0.5775 
 
KS 0.1674 (0.7) 
AD2 0.5663 (0.6) 
Cap. estimate/Gross income 11.53% 
 Source: Author 
Figure 3.9: QQ plot for BMM – Max per quarter 
 
 Source: Author 
 The second BMM approach, which uses the maximum per year quarters, provide even better fit 
to the data because both the KS and the AD tests have the p-value higher than 50%. The QQ plot 
                                                             
82 Note that the 100th percentile for estimated distribution is not plotted to the figure due to its extreme value 
83 These results comply with the conclusions of Dutta, Perry (2007) 
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suggests the same and thus the tail of the BANK data sample is modeled almost perfectly. The results 
can, however, be impacted by the low number of observations in the data sample (only 16).  
 The random data generated by the Max quarter GEV method exhibit the very heavy right tail as 
well, but the differences between the VaR0.99 and the CVaR0.99 are not that big as in the previous case. 
Also the capital estimate measure provides significantly better result than in the previous case which 
favors this method over the previous one. Therefore the BMM – Max quarter will be used further on 
during the stress testing procedures. 
 
3.2.4.2 EVT – Peak over threshold method 
 
 Three approaches for the POTM were used. The first two set the threshold to 5% and 10%, 
respectively, of the observations with the highest loss amount from the data sample. The third one is 
more advanced. Under this approach the optimal value of the threshold is estimated by using the mean 
excess plot. 
 All approaches work with a different number of the highest observations – namely with 32, 65 
and 61 observations, respectively. It might be assumed that the results provided by the second and the 
third approach will be very similar, while the results provided by the first approach will differ. In all cases 
the tail of the data sample was modeled by the GPD distribution and the body of the data sample was 
modeled by the ESM. The EasyFitXL was used for the parameter estimation and the random number 
generation. Other, more advanced, approaches could be used for the parameter estimation. For more 
details see Teply, Chalupka (2008). In all three cases the estimate of shape parameter 𝜉  was positive, 
therefore the GPD distribution exhibits very heavy tails. 
Table 3.:12 POTM – max 5% GPD statistics 
𝝁  45,785 
𝜍  254,863 
 
𝜉  0.5919 
 
KS 0.1844 (0.20) 
AD2 1.0667 (0.25) 
Cap. estimate/Gross income 9.32% 
 Source: Author 
 The first method works with the 32 highest observations from the tail and 625 observations from 
the body of the data sample. There should be enough observations for the GPD in order to provide 
statistically relevant estimates and, on the other hand, not too many observations to impose a bias 
because of including unreasonable high amount of observations from the body of the data sample. None 
of the statistical tests can be rejected at conventional significance levels and so the GPD is able to model 
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5% of the highest observations very well. The QQ plot shows the same result - the estimated and 
empirical quantiles are very similar. 
Figure 3.10: QQ plot for POTM – max 5% 
 
 Source: Author 
 The VaR0.99 and the CVaR0.99 measures again significantly differ from each other, this approach is 
thus able to model heavy tails. The capital estimate computed by this method is very reasonable and in 
accordance with the assumptions stated above. Even though the length of the tail was set using a up-
down method, the results are very promising.  This method will be used for scenario analysis. 
Table 3.13: POTM – max 10% GPD statistics 
𝝁  34,018 
𝜍  90,159 
𝜉  0.72804 
KS 0.1264 (0.23) 
AD2 1.7131 (0.17) 
Cap. estimate/Gross income 16.12% 
 Source: Author 
 The second POTM works with the 65 highest observations from the data sample. This number is 
probably too high, because it contains also observations with a lower loss than EUR 50,000. Due to this 
fact, the results might be worse than in the previous case and the GPD might not fit the empirical tail 
distribution that well. This assumption is confirmed by both the KS and the AD tests which have a lower 
p-value and also by the visual inspection of the QQ plot for which the estimated quantiles do not 
correspond with the empirical ones that well. The capital estimate computed by this method is 
approximatelly the same as the one computed by the BMM – Max quarter method. Accroding to the 
assumptions stated above the capital estimate of 16% seems to be too high – especially since only 
internal loss data were considered. 
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Figure 3.11: QQ plot for POTM – max 10% 
 
 Source: Author 
Figure 3.12: Mean excess plot for POTM 
 
 Source: Author 
Table 3.14: POTM – threshold GPD statistics 
𝝁  36,948 
𝜍  97,041 
𝜉  0.7223 
KS 0.1335 (0.21) 
AD2 1.8575 (0.16) 
Cap. estimate/Gross income 13.58% 
 Source: Author 
 The last POTM method sets the threshold level using a bottom-up approach by a visual 
inspection of the mean excess plot.  In case of the BANK data sample the mean excess plot, defined as a 
relation between the threshold level u and mean excess of observations above the threshold level E(u), 
becomes flat for the threshold of EUR 49,000 – as shown on Figure 3.12 where the blue arrow points to 
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the optimal threshold level. The number of observations above the threshold level is 61, which is about 
the same as for the previous POTM – Max 10% method, thus one can expect approximately the same 
results. The parameter estimates are very similar to the previous case – the GOFTs p-values are even 
lower and the QQ plot suggest a lower fit between the empirical and the GPD distribution.  
 This method again provided quite high capital estimate measure, given the fact that the original 
historical loss database was not merged with the external loss data. This method thus also provides 
overestimated capital charge and therefore the method is not very suitable to model the OR data. 
Figure 3.13: QQ plot for POTM -  threshold 
 
 Source: Author 
 
3.2.5 Comparison of the results for regulatory capital charge 
 
 The frequency distribution was not evaluated from the statistical point of view and it was not 
compared with an alternative distribution neither. It has been suggested by several researchers that 
frequency distribution is not of such an importance as severity distribution and that the Poisson 
distribution should be suitable for modeling the OR loss frequency. 
 The ESMs provide quite low capital estimates, because the data sampling algorithm puts the 
same weight on the body and on the tail of the data sample. And thus ESM is not suitable to model the 
whole data sample – on the other hand, it is a suitable distribution in combination with an EVT method. 
Table 3.15: ESM results 
Method Capital estimate 
ESS – Whole sample 2.31% 
ESM – 1,000+ sample 2.92% 
 Source: Author 
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 As concluded above, all parametric loss severity except the g&h distribution provided a poor fit 
to the OR data and therefore were not considered suitable for the estimation of the regulatory and the 
economic capital required to cover potential losses. The Table 3.16 lists the statistical fit and capital 
estimates as the percentage of the gross income for the parametric distributions used above. The 
conclusion is that parametric distribution underestimate economic and regulatory capital. The only 
suitable parametric distribution is the g&h distribution. It can be assumed, that the g&h distribution 
would be suitable even for the stress testing measures, where the tail of the data is enriched by extreme 
events defined in a particular scenario. For more details see chapter 5. 
 The results might differ, if the robust statistic methods or different threshold levels are used for 
the parametric distributions. However, this issue is beyond the focus of this rigorous thesis. 
Table 3.16: Comparison of parametric distribution used for LDA 
Distribution Statistical fit Capital estimate 
Weibull Very poor 0.69% 
Exponential Very poor 0.95% 
Gamma Poor 1.12% 
Lognormal Poor 1.49% 
G&h Moderate 4.43% 
 Source: Author 
 At the first sight, the better results were achieved by modeling the body and the tail of the data 
sample using different distributions – i.e. by using the EVT approach. Since the extreme events were 
separated from the body of the data sample, the ESM can better fit the body, because the skewness, 
kurtosis and variance measures are much lower. So the ESM MC method can provide reasonable 
estimates based on the body of the data sample. On the other hand, the tail can be modeled by using 
EVT methods that can better capture effects of the extreme events. The crucial task for the EVT is to split 
the body and the tail of the data sample. Five different methods for this task were used. The best results 
were achieved by using the BMM – max per quarter and the POTM – max 5% methods. These methods 
will be used further on for stress testing purposes.  
 It should be noted that even if the number of MC trials was set to 50,000 the simulation results 
and the statistical measures such as the CVaR0.99 might be biased –it might thus be beneficial to increase 
the number of MC trials even to 100,000 or more. There are also several methods for the EVT GEV and 
GPD parameters estimation. Due to the low number of tail events, the PWM method for parameter 
estimation might provide biased results and so more advanced methods can be used – e.g. the Hill’s or 
the Pickand’s estimator. Also the VaR measures were computed based on the aggregated one-year 
losses distribution and not by using a computational formula, which might result in slightly different 
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estimates. But even though these objections exist, it can be assumed that the EVT results are statistically 
relevant and that they can be used as estimates of the capital charge under Basel II even though the 
overall results are often overestimated. The limited data sample makes the GEV and the GPD parameter 
estimation method very sensitive to each new observation that is added to the data sample. 
Table 3.17: EVT method statistics 
Method Distr. Body Distr. Tail Stat. fit Cap. estimate 
BMM – max per month Empirical GEV Good 14.95% 
BMM – max per quarter Empirical GEV Very good 11.53% 
POTM – max 5% Empirical GPD Very good 9.32% 
POTM – max 10% Empirical GPD Good 13.58% 
POTM – threshold Empirical GPD Good 16.12% 
 Source: Author 
 The figure 3.14 provides a comparison of the methods used for modeling the OR data84 by 
plotting the one-year aggregated loss amounts on x-axis (in EUR millions) and the number of aggregated 
loss amount trials (out of 50,000 trials), in particular loss intervals on the y-axis. Note that the x-axis is 
trimmed and just the first 30 items are shown. For some of the distributions the x-axis range up to EUR 
4,000M, which signals extremely heavy tails! But for the main part of the one-year loss distribution, the 
distribution provided by the ESM is best copied by the BMM – Max quarter approach. The g&h and the 
POTM – max threshold methods have higher concentration of aggregated one-year losses in the lower 
loss magnitudes intervals. But all of the approaches used on figure 3.14 provide a reasonable fit to the 
empirical one-year loss amounts. The EVT methods have much longer tails than the ESM or the 
parametric distribution approaches. This is also signaled by on the CVaR0.99 measure. 
                                                             
84 Only those methods that provide reasonable fit to the data were used 
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Figure 3.14: Aggregated loss magnitudes distribution 
 
 Source: Author 
 The conclusion for the LDA approach on the institution level is that only the g&h, the BMM – 
Max quarter and the POTM – Max 5% methods seem to be suitable for modeling the OR data for Basel II 
purposes and thus these methods will be used for the stress testing purposes in chapter 5. 
 
3.2.6 Comparison of results for economic capital estimates 
 
 As already explained above, even such a high VaR confidence level as 99.9%, that is used to 
estimate the regulatory capital charge required by Basel II might not be sufficient enough to cover very 
extreme events. The economic capital that would cover such extreme events can thus exceed the 
regulatory capital. We used an alternative method which estimates the economic capital as the CVaR0.99 
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measure.85 The measure value is very high for most of the distributions, especially for the EVT methods. 
Thus some other parameter than the gross income of BANK should be used as a proxy, because the bank 
might not be able to cover these extreme losses just from the gross income – it might be needed to 
employ the total bank equity or even some portion of assets. The Table 3.18 provides the comparison of 
the CVaR measures for particular distributions as a proportion of the gross income and the total equity 
of BANK.  
Table 3.18: Comparison of the economic capital measures 
Distribution CVaR0.99/Gross Income CVaR0.99/Total Equity 
Empirical 2.85% 1.51% 
G&H 12.66% 6.71% 
BMM – Month 91.62% 48.58% 
BMM – Quarter 75.06% 39.80% 
POT – 5% 35.81% 18.89% 
POT - T 43.72% 23.18% 
 Source: Author 
 As it is clear from the Table 3.18, the ESM provides just a very low economic capital estimate. 
Even if a higher CVaR confidence level, such as CVaR0,999, is used, the economic capital estimates given by 
the ESM are quite low. The other methods, especially the EVT methods, exhibit very high values of 
CVaR0.99 measures. In case of the BMM – Max month method the measure value almost equals the gross 
income. But even by considering these very extreme events, BANK is able to survive and cover the losses 
from the gross income. Just if the CVaR0.999 measure is employed, the value of this measure would be too 
high to be covered from the total equity. The probability that this situation happens is as low as 
0.01 ∗ 0.001 = 0.00001. Such scenario might be e.g. a civil war or a loss as big as the one imposed by 
recent unauthorized trading case that happened in Société Générale (SG) in 200886.  In such case other 
bank funds would have to be used – such as new share issuance or a bond capital. 
 The conclusion is that while employing the very high significance levels for EVT methods, the 
economic capital is being overestimated. But even despite of the overestimation, it was shown that 
BANK would be able to survive those very severe OR events. Because of the high sensitivity of the EVT 
methods, it can be concluded that the g&h method provides more reasonable estimates than any EVT 
method used.  
                                                             
85 It should be noted that estimates of the CVaR0,99 measure might not be relevant enough, because the number of 
the MC simulations was just 50,000 and so the CVaR0,99 measure employed only 500 simulations, which means that 
the result can be biased 
86 See chapter 5 for more details on this event. 
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3.3 LDA results per business lines & event types 
 
 Because of the fact that the loss events differ per business line – there are business lines with 
low frequency but high severity events such as BANK commercial and, on the other hand, there are 
business lines with high frequency/low severity events such as BANK trading - the data distribution for 
each business line can be modeled separately in order to better fit the empirical data. However, this task 
is beyond the focus of this rigorous thesis and might be considered as a suggestion for the future 
research.  
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Chapter 4 - Stress testing and scenario analysis 
 
 Because of the fact that the LDA approach is a historical one – the capital charge is estimated 
based on historical loss events - alternative methods for the OR management were developed, as 
discussed in chapter 1.6. One of those methods is the scenario analysis or, generally, the stress testing. 
This method is supposed to examine whether a financial institution would be able to undergo 
exceptional risk losses. Stress testing can be defined as “the examination of the potential effects on a 
bank’s financial condition of a set of specified changes in risk factors, corresponding to exceptional but 
plausible events.”87 An alternative definition is given by Chernobai (2007): “Stress tests are intended to 
explore the effect of low probability events that lie outside the predictive capacity of any statistical 
model on VaR” or the one used by the BIS Committee on the Global Financial System, where stress 
testing is defined as “a generic term describing various techniques used by financial firms to gauge their 
potential vulnerability to exceptional, extreme or simply unexpected but plausible events.”88  
 The stress testing should be used as a complementary approach to the VaR based LDA approach 
in order to ensure that a bank would be able to cover the losses even if a bank faces more severe risk 
events – such as the worst-case scenario. Stress testing should be used as a complementary method to 
the Scoreboard and the KRI approaches, where impact of a particular risk factor can be stress tested. 
Illová (2005) emphasizes two reasons for using stress testing as a complement to the VaR approach – the 
first is that VaR is based only on historical data which might not serve as the best predictor of the future 
and the second reason is that VaR relies on the normal distribution of risk factors.89 Thus stress testing 
should be used in order to ensure that a financial institution would be able to handle such risk events 
that did not happen in the past and to ensure that the regulatory capital estimate is robust enough to 
outlast these extreme events. Stress tests are used primarily for understanding the risk profile of a firm. 
However, they are being used for capital allocation as well. “Whenever the stress tests reveal some 
weakness, management must take steps to manage the identified risks. One solution could be to set 
aside enough capital to absorb potential large losses. Too often, however, this amount will be cripplingly 
large, reducing the return on capital.”90 The goal is to ensure that the institution can survive such events, 
while keeping return on capital on a reasonably level. 
 The concept of stress testing might seem straightforward in comparison to a complex statistical 
LDA method. Just few theoretical or empirical papers devoted purely to stress testing theory exist – 
probably due to the fact, that the tests are usually based on empirical and often confidential data and so 
                                                             
87 Illová (2005) 
88 BCFGS (2000) 
89 This reason does not usually apply to OR modeling 
90 Jorion (2007) 
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they are not available to the public. The field of stress testing in the area of OR are still being developed, 
so there is a high flexibility of choosing specific methods that would best fit the financial institution. On 
the other hand, stress testing methods are not comparable with each other. Neither the applications of 
the same stress tests to different financial institutions are comparable with each other, because the 
results are always bound to the specific risk profile of a financial institution. The stress testing methods 
are thus subjective. Adopting bad assumptions or using irrelevant scenarios will lead to irrelevant losses. 
 Even though Basel II specifically refers to the stress testing methods for credit and market risks 
as one of the seven conditions financial institutions are required to satisfy in order to use internal 
models, the stress testing methods for the OR are mentioned just merely in paragraph No. 675 which 
states that “a bank must use scenario analysis of expert opinion in conjunction with external data to 
evaluate its exposure to high severity events.”91  The Incorporation of scenario analysis is also required 
by regulators. 
 As for the other methods, the stress testing was originally applied for market and credit risks and 
it was modified to fit the OR management later on. The models for credit and market risk stress testing 
are discussed in Illová (2005). There are none widely accepted theoretical models for the OR stress 
testing – however some literature exists on scenario analysis. An interesting application is provided in 
paper by Kuhn, Neu (2004) - they apply methods used for collective phenomena and phase transition on 
modeling the OR. They use stress tests in order to asses metastability of networks of interacting 
processes with different dependencies and failure rates. However, this advanced application of stress 
testing is beyond the focus of this rigorous thesis. 
 Since the stress tests often define events with a very low probability of occurrence92, the results 
become difficult to interpret and it is not clear which actions should be taken by the management in 
order to mitigate the risks. Quite often the results of stress tests appear unacceptably large and they are 
just ignored and dismissed as irrelevant. As Jorion (2007) states, a financial institution is not supposed to 
handle all the possible states of the world like a widespread nuclear war. The central banks are supposed 
to support financial institutions in case of systematic crisis. Other actions besides increasing economic 
capital were proposed – such as insurance for the extreme events, business restructuralization in order 
to achieve better diversification and lower exposure to the risks in question or developing a special plan 
for corrective actions once a scenario starts happening. Such actions should ensure that the institution 
would be able to survive, should the scenario happen while keeping a reasonable level of economic 
capital. However, “a general way” to interpret results of stress tests does not exist, because the results 
are highly subjective and they depend on the choice of the test methods and the scenarios. This differs 
stress testing from the LDA approach, which provides more objective estimates of the economic capital. 
                                                             
91 BCBS (2006), differences between stress testing and scenario analysis will be discussed in the following chapter 
92 Or in the case of hypothetical scenarios this probability is defined very merely 
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 The alternative approach to scenario analysis is a robust statistics method discussed in 
Chernobai (2007). While scenario analysis method adds new extreme observations to the data sample, 
the robust methods exclude the most severe losses and focus on modeling the data sample that is 
trimmed from the right side. 
 
4.1 Stress testing methods 
 
 Two stress testing methods are mentioned in the literature – they differ in the number of risk 
factors used. The classification of the stress test methods is shown on figure 4.1: 
Figure 4.1: Stress testing methods 
 
 Source: Author 
 
4.1.1 Sensitivity tests 
 
 Sensitivity tests are single-factor tests that analyze impact of a single risk factor on the risk 
exposure of a bank. These tests are quite easy to perform but are not very useful to assess overall risk 
robustness of the institution. They are more or less a statistical concept that modifies some parameter of 
the LDA model. Sensitivity tests are not very often used in case of OR and they are also not being 
mentioned in the literature on the OR management. They are more useful in case of market or credit 
risk, where theoretical models are more developed. In case of the OR it is very difficult to isolate the 
impact of a particular risk factor. The only LDA factors are the frequency and the severity of the OR 
events, while for the market risk one can study impact of changes in volatility, correlation, equity index 
or yield curves. 
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4.1.2 Scenario analysis 
 
 “Scenario analysis consists of evaluating the portfolio under various extreme but probable states 
of world.”93 The purpose of defining a scenario is to answer the question: “How a bank would suffer 
under such scenario?” The advantage of this method over the LDA is that linking the loss to a specific 
event is more intuitive for the OR managers. 
 The scenarios can be divided into two groups based on the type of event they define. The first 
group uses historical events like 9/11 terrorist attack or unauthorized trading that happened in SG in 
2007. Risk managers study a potential impact of those events on the financial institution. The second 
group, which is more widely used in practice, uses hypothetical scenarios. The scenarios are based on 
some plausible risk events that have not happened yet, but a non-zero probability of their occurrence 
exists. A scenario can also be based on an analysis of a new product a bank is going to implement.  
 Risk managers should build a scenario based on the risk factors that have a direct impact on the 
financial institution – such as an electricity failure or internet banking security breach. And so the 
scenario construction is usually a top-down method, when at first the stress event is defined and then 
the impact of this event is being discussed and evaluated. The bottom-up approach is also possible – 
under this approach “each department sets its own scenario through comprehensive analysis of 
operational errors and accidents, internal control condition, business environment, etc.”94 In both cases 
OR managers are required to estimate the frequency and severity of a potential event. 
 A typical scenario consists of the description of a complex state of the world that would impose 
an extreme risk event on a financial institution, including probabilities and frequencies of occurrence of 
the particular state of the world, business activities impacted by the event and maximum internal and 
external loss amounts generated by occurrence of such event, possible mitigation techniques including 
insurance against such an extreme event. Even though such a scenario claims to be realistic, it is not 
possible to comprise all possible risk factors and features – however, risk managers are trying to define 
the scenarios, so that they correspond to the reality as much as possible. Such scenarios, that are likely 
to severely impact the financial institution, should be used. It is clear that “the generation of relevant 
scenarios is a time-consuming process that requires quantitative skills as well as good economic 
understanding of the factors”95 financial institution are exposed to. However, some adverse motivations 
for risk managers may exist – either to underreport the risk exposure in order to produce “nice results” 
or to use a too large number of scenarios just to be sure any likely state of the world is covered. Internal 
control methods should be used in order to achieve the optimal stress testing method application. 
                                                             
93 Jorion (2007) 
94 Arai (2006) 
95 Jorion (2007) 
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  Rosengren (2006) describes a usual way how a scenario is created. Based on his experience from 
the US environment a scenario is defined on a workshop that “brings together managers to have a 
structured scenario discussion.”96 External consultants are often asked to cross-check results of a 
scenario. It is crucial to question, which type of data is used and also which scenario types are used. It is 
also very important for the management to ensure that the risk managers are sufficiently motivated to 
accurately evaluate frequency and severity of the losses.  All the scenarios should be back-tested and 
validated by other internal or external experts in order to minimize the subjectivity of a scenario. 
 If a financial institution is able to implement appropriate scenario analysis policy, then this 
method provides a comprehensive overview of the impact of plausible events. It provides creditable 
quantitative basis, where the results can be further aggregated with the LDA methods on a company or 
business line levels and impact of such a scenario on the economic capital and the regulatory capital 
charge can be estimated. Concrete scenarios, together with its integration process with the method 
based on historical loss data, will be described and analyzed in the following chapter. 
 
4.1.2.1 Scenario analysis implementation in BANK 
 
 BANK combines all four main approaches for the OR management – including the scenario 
analysis. Each scenario requires special ad hoc analysis by experts from the departments the scenario is 
connected with. Those experts evaluate all possible consequences of such a scenario from the financial 
losses and frequency point of view. The experts are obliged to take into account all available empirical 
data in order to evaluate, what is the proportion and magnitude of internal and external losses. They 
also must consider external (legal, business) and internal (internal controls) environment specifics to 
determine, what is the frequency of such a scenario and how to control potential losses. The aim of using 
scenarios is, as explained above, “to get an overview about low frequency events that might have severe 
impact on BANK.” BANK is using a set of scenarios that will be used for stress testing. 
Figure 4.2: Scenario analysis process 
 
 Source: BANK 
                                                             
96 Rosengren (2006) 
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 There exists a unified form used for a scenario definition. The process of scenario definition is 
shown on figure 4.3.  
Figure 5.3: Scenario creation method – BANK form 
 
 Source: BANK  
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Chapter 5 - Applied scenario analysis  
 
 This chapter describes scenarios used for the stress testing of the LDA results. Several simple 
scenarios based on historical events were used. The impact of the scenarios developed by BANK will be 
evaluated as well as the custom scenarios will be defined and their impact will be analyzed. 
 
5.1 Sensitivity test application 
 
 Since the model for OR considers just the severity and frequency factors, it is not very beneficial 
to perform a sensitivity analysis based on changes in one of these parameters. It might be assumed that 
a change in a parameter would cause a corresponding change in the regulatory capital estimate. It is of a 
higher importance to stress test the VaR measures by employing particular scenarios. 
 
5.2 Scenario analysis application 
 
 The scenario analysis method was used to examine the impact of plausible events on the 
regulatory capital and the economic capital estimates and also on the business continuity plan of BANK. 
Two main approaches were used to aggregate losses generated by the scenarios with the database of 
historical events. The first one uses a set of the worst-case losses defined by a particular scenario and 
aggregates these losses to the historical loss data sample. The second approach calculates an average 
loss given by probability distribution of the loss amounts defined by a particular scenario and aggregates 
those average losses to the historical loss data sample. In both cases the statistical distributions 
mentioned above, the g&h, the POT – Max 5% and the BMM – Max quarter, were used for the severity 
distribution of the aggregated loss sample. The Poisson distribution was used for the loss frequency. 
Both distribution were then aggregated and the economic and regulatory capital estimates were 
computed by using the VaR and the CVaR measures. 
 In case of the g&h loss severity distribution, the aggregation method of losses generated by the 
scenarios with the historical data sample is straightforward, because the additional losses are simply 
added to the database. However, in the of the EVT approaches, where the body and the tail of the 
distribution are being modeled by using a different statistical distribution, the aggregation algorithm is 
more complicated, because all of the losses generated by the scenarios belong to the tail of the 
aggregated database distribution and thus it directly impacts the EVT methods. The most complicated 
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case is the BMM, for which an additional algorithm had to be used in order to randomly distribute the 
additional losses over the whole four-year period. 
 Multiple scenarios are combined together. It should be noted, that the probability, that the 
worst-case joint scenario combination would occur to BANK during the observed four-year period, is very 
low. Further details are provided below.  
 The alternative approach to combine the forward-looking scenario analysis method and the 
backward-looking LDA method was implemented in several papers. Rosengren (2006) suggests using the 
scenario analysis as a separate method for the regulatory capital estimation. Mignola, Ugoccioni (2007) 
suggest to use more advanced method, where “the risk measures from historical losses and scenario 
analysis are finally compound using Bayesian methods.”97 Guidici (2003) further details the process of 
using the Bayesian model that allows “integration between qualitative and quantitative data”98 by 
constructing a Bayesian network. However, this method is beyond the focus of this paper. As mentioned 
above, a less sophisticated aggregation method was used, where the LDA approach is applied to a 
database consisting of both the historical and scenario generated loss events. 
 In section 5.3 scenarios are combined into several packages, denoted by test IDs. Both the worst-
case and the average losses are considered. We merge those losses with the original loss database and 
then estimate the VaR and the CVaR regulatory and economic capital estimates using the aggregation 
method described in chapter 2.6. The tests differ by the number of scenarios they use – at first all 
scenarios defined by BANK as well as the custom scenarios are considered.99 Then the number of 
scenarios considered is gradually decreased. Separate tests are run for the custom scenarios and for 
more frequent BANK scenarios. 
 
5.2.1 Scenarios defined by BANK 
 
 The losses generated by the BANK scenarios were merged with the historical loss events from 
the years 2003-2007 using the method explained above.  The scenarios will be denoted by IDs further on. 
The worst-case losses together with the probability that such worst-case loss happens as well as average 
losses, which have been computed as a probability weighted average of the loss estimates defined by 
the particular scenario, are considered for the stress testing purposes. In most cases the average loss is 
many times lower than the worst-case loss, which means, that even if an event defined in a scenario 
happens, usually the loss severity is sustainable. The average loss amounts for all of the scenarios are 
                                                             
97 Mignola, Ugoccioni (2007) 
98 Guidici (2003) 
99 “Custom” denotes a scenario defined for the purpose of this rigorous thesis 
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comparable to the other tail losses from the original historical data sample, thus these eight losses just 
enrich the original tail of the data. On the other hand, the magnitudes of the worst case losses are 
apparently higher than the magnitude of the highest historical losses and so the right tail of such merged 
sample is much heavier than for the case of the historical data sample.  
 A financial institution should evaluate, whether it would be able to survive even the most 
extreme cases of the scenario it assesses or not. The probability that all the worst-case events defined by 
the joint scenario combination occur during the observed period limits to zero. But if this happens, then 
it can be rightly expected that the impact on a financial institution would be very severe. In some cases a 
financial institution might even default, because it would not be able to cover those extreme losses. 
 
5.2.2 Custom scenarios 
 
 The following sections list custom scenarios defined by the author. Three different historical 
scenarios were defined – the first one is based on an unauthorized trading, the second one is based on 
an external fraud and the third one is based on process management failure loss even types. All of those 
scenarios are based on concrete historical events – the loss amounts are rescaled to fit the size of BANK. 
 On the other hand, the custom hypothetical scenario ID12 is more complex and copies the 
format of scenarios defined by BANK. The frequency and the loss severity distribution of the scenario is 
estimated based on the stated assumptions and empirical data. 
 
5.2.2.1 Historical scenarios 
 
Table 5.1: Historical scenarios list – loss amounts in EUR 1,000s 
ID Scenario name Estimated loss 
9 Unauthorized trading – Kerviel 112,000 
10 Process management failure – software loss 7,300 
11 External fraud – Prochazka 21,180 
 Source: Author 
 The historical scenarios are based on three operational risk events that happened in the recent 
years. Table 5.1 lists these historical scenarios including the loss amount occurred. Since the historical 
events will not reoccur in the future, we have not estimated the frequency of those events, nor the 
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probability distribution of the loss. The estimated losses are quite high and thus they will be treated as 
the worst-case losses. The historical scenarios will not be used for tests based on average losses.  
 The first historical scenario ID9 is based on a recent unauthorized trading of Jerome Kerviel in 
SG.100 The trader was concluding hidden deals on security trading, hoping to reverse losses from the past 
trading. At the end of his actions the loss amounted to EUR 5,000M. This event was the most severe OR 
loss event ever happened – the loss amount was four times higher than the loss caused by Nick Leeson 
to the Barings bank in 1995. The loss amount was rescaled to fit the BANK size. 
 The second historical scenario ID10 is based on a recent process management failure – software 
loss event that happened directly to BANK. The interbank transaction fees were rounded to a slightly 
lower value (1/100 of 1 CZK). Given the huge number of transactions and the four years duration of this 
incorrect system settings, the total loss to BANK amounted to CZK 200M which is about EUR 7.3M.  
 Finally, the last historical scenario ID11 is based on a recent external fraud – robbery event.101 
Frantisek Prochazka, an employee of a security agency, stole cash in the amount of CZK 564M. More 
than half of these money belonged to CSOB, a competitor of BANK. This event was the biggest robbery 
event ever happened in the Czech Republic. The loss amount in EUR is 21.18M. 
 
5.2.2.2 Complex hypothetical scenario 
 
 A scenario of BANK employee strike that would hit all the regions is considered. This type of 
scenario was chosen because of the fact, that historical evidence of similar events exists. Such scenario 
belongs to the Employment Practices and Workplace safety Basel II event category. 
 The frequency of the scenario assessment was estimated to 1 per 40 years based on the 
following facts: according to the historical data there were several bank employee strikes in recent years 
- two of them in India, one in Canada TD Trust bank, one in Greece national bank.102 The duration of the 
strike ranged from 1 day to 1 week. It is assumed that the frequency of strikes would be quite low in the 
region of Central Europe. The strikes in Central Europe are more likely to happen in the public sector 
(schools, railways) or in manufacturing firms (car industry). Usually the duration of such strike is limited 
only to several hours.  
                                                             
100
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%A9r%C3%B4me_Kerviel  
101
 http://zpravy.idnes.cz/zlodej-pul-miliardy-prochazka-vzal-penize-i-csob-f6f-/krimi.asp?c=A071210_215034_krimi_zra  
102
 http://www.northernlife.ca/News/LocalNews/2007/06-18-07-bankstrike.asp?NLStory=06-18-07-bankstrike  
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2004/02/07/stories/2004020701281701.htm 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/04/business/4drachmafw.php  
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 The other important feature of a strike is its extent – a strike can range from one branch to a 
country wide strike. A strike can also hit either one particular company or it can be an industry-wide. The 
reasons why employees decide to go on include a disagreement with changes in law or working 
conditions, pension funds, compensations or organizational changes etc. Several internal controls that 
may contribute to reduce the frequency of such event might be considered – e.g. a more professional 
human resource management, a competitive employee compensation scheme and an improved 
communication with trade unions.  
 For the purpose of this rigorous thesis it was assumed, that the employee from all regions would 
go on strike. Such a scenario has a very low probability, but if it occurred it would have significant 
negative impact on the bank. Optionally it can be assumed that the strike would hit just some regions – 
the frequency and severity estimates would have to be modified for such a limited extent scenario. The 
severity impact of the scenario depends on two factors – the extent and the duration of the strike. The 
extent was set to the whole country. The duration is assumed to range from one hour strike to five 
business days strike and the probability for each class was estimated according to the assumptions 
stated above. 
 A strike was assumed to cause four types of losses – the direct loss of lost revenue from 
branches was estimated based on the list of BANK branches and their revenues per day.  The second 
source of loss are the costs connected with expenses on substitute employees that would be hired in 
order to maintain the bank critical operations. These costs increase with the duration of the strike and 
were estimated as a certain percentage of the direct loss of revenue (up to 40% for the most severe 
case). The third and the most severe type of loss is the loss of clients that was estimated as a proportion 
of yearly revenue from branches. While a 1 hour strike is not considered to have impact on customer 
satisfaction, in case of a whole week strike up to 5% of customers might decide to move to competitors. 
The last but not least type of the loss are the costs connected with commercial disputes. The losses were 
estimated based on interest costs from non-realized transactions and estimated amount of dispute 
penalties. The number of transactions is based on the number of transactions via internet banking and 
the proportion of customers that do not use internet banking.  After taking into account all the assumed 
loss sources, the total loss was computed. The loss amounts and the probability distribution are listed in 
Table 5.2 – the loss amount grows as the duration of the strike increases. 
Table 5.2: Strike duration probability distribution 
Probability Duration Estimated loss (EUR) 
70% 
 
1 hour 138,515 
25% 1 day 
 
3,750,446 
4% 2-4 days 
 
9,056,450 
1% 5 days 20,890,382 
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 Source: Author 
 The worst case scenario is a strike that lasts five days. Under this case the loss amount reaches 
EUR 20M. Such strike is considered to cause significant harm to BANK – especially by the loss of 5% 
customers. Such scenario would also have very negative impact on the brand image and the banks 
reputation would be severely harmed. The average loss size is significantly lower though – EUR 1,6M. 
Table 5.3: Custom hypothetical scenario details – loss amounts in EUR 1,000s 
ID Scenario name Worst-case loss Average loss 
12 Employee strike – whole state 20,890 1,606 
 Source: Author 
 Table 5.3 provides an overview of the custom hypothetical scenario. This scenario will be used 
further during the stress testing and its potential effects in combination with other scenarios will be 
considered. 
 
5.3 Tests – Scenario combinations and loss aggregation estimates 
 
 In total six tests were run. The aim was to analyze, whether BANK would be able to handle 
particular combinations of events defined in the scenarios employed for a particular test combination. 
The impact of such joint scenario was evaluated. Scenarios were denoted by the IDs assigned above. For 
the hypothetical scenarios (ID 1-8 and 12) two level of loss were considered – the worst-case level and 
the average level. For historical scenarios (ID9-11) only the worst-case loss amount is defined. The dates 
of event occurrence was set by a random number generator – this information is important for the BMM 
method. 
 Three statistical approaches were used to model the merged data sample – the g&h, the EVT – 
BMM Max Quarter and the EVT – POT 5% methods. The estimates provided by each of these methods 
were evaluated in the following sections. The goodness of fit statistics are not provided at this point, 
because they were already evaluated in chapter 3. Each of the scenario defines an extreme event that is 
expected to have significant impact on the capital estimates – and so the loss events belong to the tail of 
the data sample. 
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5.3.1 Test I – All scenarios 
 
 In the first test all scenarios were considered and all the defined losses were merged with the 
original empirical OR event database. The sample size grew by 12 more observations to the total of 669. 
All of the custom events belong to the top 5% of the data sample implying that all of these observations 
will be used for the POTM 5% method. For the BMM – Max quarter method not all custom events will be 
used, because some of them were generated to happen in the same quarter. 
 For the worst-case stress test, 4 out of 12 defined loss amounts are significantly higher than the 
rest of the data (all of them are higher than EUR 20M) – namely in the case of scenarios 5, 9, 11 and 12. 
So the tail of the data is much more heavier than in case of the original data sample – the highest loss 
amount is about 20 times higher than the highest loss amount from the original sample. The sum of all 
custom losses (EUR 278M) is 10 times higher than the sum of all 657 empirical losses. Because of these 
facts it can be rightly assumed that the capital estimates would be very high and that the bank might not 
be able to allocate such high level of capital. 
Table 5.4: Test I – Worst-case scenarios capital estimates103 
Distribution Regulatory capital Economic capital 
G&H 91% 236% 
POT 5% 207% 532% 
BMM – Quarter 245% 443% 
 Source: Author 
 Table 5.4 clearly shows that the EVT based methods provide very high regulatory and economic 
capital estimates. The amount of the regulatory capital according to both EVT methods would reach five 
times higher value than the total equity of BANK, which would be about 40% of BANK total assets! Such 
huge loss would very likely mean that BANK would not be able to meet its liabilities and would be forced 
to default. The estimates provided by the g&h distribution are approximately two times lower than for 
the EVT methods. Even though this would mean quite a significant harm to BANK, under certain 
circumstances it can be considered that BANK would be able to handle these losses by additional 
financial sources provided by a public offer, external investors or SG.  
 In the average loss case,104 the additional loss amounts are more comparable to the original loss 
amounts than in the previous case. The highest average loss is in fact lower than the highest empirical 
loss and the sum of all custom losses is EUR 10M, which is about 35% of the sum of all empirical loss 
                                                             
103 The economic capital is measured as CVaR0,99/Total Equity 
104 Only 9 average loss observations were considered - the historical scenarios do not define the average loss 
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amounts. But still all of the custom observations belong to the tail of the data sample. Thus it can be 
assumed that the capital estimates would be higher than in case of the original data sample, but the 
difference would be significantly lower than in the previous case. 
 
Table 5.5: Test I – Average loss scenario capital estimates 
Distribution Regulatory capital Economic capital 
G&H 11.7% 18.9% 
POT 5% 4.3% 4.8% 
BMM – Quarter 4.1% 3.4% 
 Source: Author 
 The capital estimates provided by both EVT methods are unreasonably low – even lower than for 
the original loss data sample. On the other hand, the g&h method provides reasonable results suggesting 
that BANK would be able to cover the OR losses from its own sources. The values of the capital estimates 
are approximately 3 times higher than in case of the original data sample. 
 The results indicate that the EVT methods are very sensitive to the number and magnitude of the 
added observations and if there is such extreme event as in case of the worst-case scenario combination, 
then the capital estimates are significantly overestimated. On the other hand, if the tail of the data is 
enriched by adding new observations with loss amounts that are comparable to each other as in case of 
the average Test I scenario, then the EVT results are underestimating capital needed to cover the risks. 
The conclusion is that the EVT approach is not consistent in modeling OR exposure of BANK and thus the 
EVT might be considered as an unsuitable method for OR measurement. 
 On the other hand, the g&h distribution provides reasonable results for both the worst-case and 
the average loss Test I methods. Even though the loss events defined for the worst-case scenario are so 
severe, that the estimated level of regulatory capital charge is unreasonably high for the bank to 
allocate. The only suitable solution would be to take the risk – especially, if the very low probability that 
all the events happen in the same 4 years period is considered. 
 
5.3.2 Test II – All BANK scenario 
 
 For the Test II some scenarios defined by BANK (ID 1-8) were considered. The probability that 
this joint scenario would happen is very low. The probability that the worst-case joint scenario would 
happen is even much lower and limits to zero. Even though this case was considered. The eight worst-
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case event losses were added to the historical loss database which amplified the tail of the empirical 
distribution. The original loss events were merged with the additional ones.  
 The results correspond with the assumptions for all methods. But again, the EVT method 
provides very high capital estimates. The g&h capital estimates are about 3 times lower than for the Test 
I. The results suggest that BANK would be able to undergo the events. However, the economic capital 
estimate reaches 80% of total equity! 
Table 5.6: Test II – worst case scenario capital estimates 
Distribution Regulatory capital Economic capital 
G&H 35.6% 77.5% 
POT 5% 129.1% 377% 
BMM – Quarter 135.7% 235.3% 
 Source: Author 
 For the average case scenario combination the loss amounts are more comparable to the 
historical losses. In fact they are very similar to the Test I which employs just one more observation 
(scenario ID12) and thus one might expect very similar results. 
Table 5.7: Test II –average loss scenario capital estimates 
Distribution Regulatory capital Economic capital 
G&H 10.1% 14.1% 
POT 5% 5.2% 6.5% 
BMM – Quarter 4% 3.3% 
 Source: Author 
 The results provided by the EVT methods are again unrealistically low suggesting that the EVT is 
not appropriate to model OR data with sufficient robustness to the specifics of the extreme 
observations. The g&h distribution provides results similar to Test I and thus similar conclusion can be 
made about BANK ability to handle the extreme losses. The economic capital level would reach 14% of 
total equity.  
 
5.3.3 Test III – More frequent BANK scenarios 
 
 In order to increase the probability that all events will happen during 4 years period the BANK 
scenarios with higher frequency. This joint probability exceeds 1% and so the scenario combination 
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should be assessed with higher importance than in the case of Test I and Test II. The probability of the 
worst case joint scenario would be, however, significantly lower.  
 The sum of the worst-case losses would still reaches EUR 100M. The capital estimates provided 
by the EVT methods are again unreasonably high. The g&h distribution provides very reasonable results 
which suggest that BANK would be able to undergo such events. 
Table 5.8: Test III – worst case scenario capital estimates 
Distribution Regulatory capital Economic capital 
G&H 20.4% 38.6% 
POT 5% 144.5% 521.7% 
BMM – Quarter 148% 295.6% 
 Source: Author 
 The EVT methods again provide unrealistically low estimates in case of average loss joint 
scenario compared to the results of the worst case joint scenarios. The regulatory capital charge 
estimate for average loss joint scenario given by the g&h distribution is about 2 times higher than in the 
case of the original data sample. This suggests that by adding a few extreme observations to the data 
sample the capital required to cover losses would increase significantly, but the new capital estimates 
would still be acceptable from the business continuity management point of view. The combination of 
the scenario analysis and the backward-looking LDA approach might thus provide reasonable estimates 
of OR exposure that would be acceptable by the bank management as well as by the regulators. 
Table 5.9: Test III – average loss scenario capital estimates 
Distribution Regulatory capital Economic capital 
G&H 8.8% 12% 
POT 5% 6.6% 9.9% 
BMM – Quarter 4.6% 4.2% 
 Source: Author 
 
5.3.4 Test IV – All custom scenarios 
 
 Test IV consists of 4 custom scenarios (9-12). The average case scenario actually considers just 
the scenario ID12, because the historical scenarios were not assigned the average loss amounts. Also it is 
not possible to evaluate the frequency of such a joint scenario, because the historical events do not have 
frequency assigned. Since the historical scenario events are very severe, it can be assumed that the 
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worst-case joint scenario capital estimates would be higher than in case of Test III. Especially the 
scenario ID9, which defines the loss amount of EUR 112M, is expected to significantly impact measures 
provided by the EVT. 
 In a correspondence with the assumptions, the capital estimated provides by the EVT methods 
are unreasonably high, especially for the POT 5% method that estimates the economic capital to the 
value of BANK total assets! If such capital should be set aside to cover losses, then BANK would not have 
any other funds to run the business. This is for sure not a possible solution. The g&h distribution provides 
reasonable results and suggests that BANK would be able to cover losses from its gross income, even 
though the amount of the funds required would be quite high. 
Table 5.10: Test IV – Worst case scenario capital estimates 
Distribution Regulatory capital Economic capital 
G&H 21.3% 38.6% 
POT 5% 200% 1101% 
BMM – Quarter 178% 488% 
 Source: Author 
 The average loss joint scenario actually considers just the loss defined in the custom hypothetical 
scenario ID12. So the results should be very similar to the original estimates because only one more 
observation was added to the data sample. The results provided by all methods follows the assumptions 
- but as for the other tests, the estimates provided by the EVT methods are actually lower than those for 
the original data sample, which further signals that the EVT methods are not ideal for modeling the OR 
data because of its high sensitivity to the number of extreme observations. The g&h distribution 
estimates are little higher because of the additional extreme observation that was added to the data 
sample. 
Table 5.11: Test IV – Average loss scenario capital estimates 
Distribution Regulatory capital Economic capital 
G&H 5.3% 7.6% 
POT 5% 8.5% 19.7% 
BMM – Quarter 8.8% 18.9% 
 Source: Author 
 
5.3.5 Test V – More frequent BANK scenarios + Custom scenarios 
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 The fifth joint scenario combines Test III and Test IV by using BANK scenarios with higher 
assessment frequency and all the custom scenarios. The sum of the additional losses is again quite high, 
so the capital estimates should be similar to Test I, where all scenarios were considered. It might be 
rightly assumed that such combination of extreme events would be destructional for the financial 
institution, because the losses would be of such magnitude that BANK would not be able to cover them.  
 The capital estimates results for the worst case combination of events follow the assumption 
stated above. The POT 5% provides results similar to Test I or Test IV. Even though the results of the g&h 
distribution are high as well, it might be assumed that BANK would be able to survive the combination of 
losses but the recovering procedure would be very costly. 
Table 5.12: Test V – Worst case scenario capital estimates 
Distribution Regulatory capital Economic capital 
G&H 70.3% 173.4% 
POT 5% 320% 902% 
BMM – Quarter 199% 466% 
 Source: Author 
 For the average loss case the estimates provided by the EVT are underestimated as for all other 
tests done. The g&h distribution suggests that even such a significant losses would not the move 
regulatory capital estimate over 10% gross income which is a reasonable level of capital for the bank to 
set aside. 
Table 5.13: Test V – Average loss scenario capital estimates 
Distribution Regulatory capital Economic capital 
G&H 9% 13.3% 
POT 5% 5.4% 7.2% 
BMM – Quarter 4.8% 6.8% 
 Source: Author 
 
5.3.6 Test VI – More frequent BANK scenarios + Custom hypothetical scenario 
 
 The last test combines Test III and the scenario ID12. The results should be quite similar to the 
results of Test III, because just one more extreme observation was added to the data sample. The worst 
case scenario results for the g&h distribution follow the assumptions – the estimated capital is about 
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30% higher than for Test III. The estimated capital level would be quite significant and it is not expected 
that the financial institution would need to reserve over 50% of its total equity to cover OR losses. 
Table 5.14: Test VI – Worst case scenario capital estimates 
Distribution Regulatory capital Economic capital 
G&H 29.7% 55.9% 
POT 5% 123% 367% 
BMM – Quarter 153% 470% 
 Source: Author 
 The results for the average loss joint scenario again show, that the EVT is not a consistent 
method. Since the number of extreme observations is very limited, each extreme observation 
significantly alters parameter estimates for the EVT methods and the aggregated distribution VaR 
measures. The g&h distribution estimates the regulatory capital to 10%. This would be a reasonable level 
for the financial institution to reserve in order to cover potential losses.105 
Table 5.15: Test VI – Average loss scenario capital estimates 
Distribution Regulatory capital Economic capital 
G&H 9.3% 14.6% 
POT 5% 5.4% 6.1% 
BMM – Quarter 5.1% 9.1% 
 Source: Author 
 
5.4 Comparison of the test results 
 
 This chapter combined 12 OR scenarios to 6 joint scenario combinations and analyzed the impact 
of the events, which are defined by the scenarios, on the regulatory and economic capital estimates. Two 
loss amounts for the additional events were used – the extreme worst-case and the average loss 
observations. The observations were merged with the original data sample and the aggregated loss 
distribution was constructed using the MC simulation.  
                                                             
105 It should be noted that the results for the average loss joint scenario combination in Test VI should be exactly 
the same as for the average loss case in Test V. But since the historical average cases were actually included to the 
data sample and the loss size was set to EUR 0, then the parameter estimates are insignificantly different and so 
are the VaR measures. 
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 All the tests suggest that the EVT method is not an appropriate one to model the OR data, 
because the results provided by both EVT methods (the BMM – Max quarter and the POTM 5%) were 
very sensitive to the number of the tail observations and to the length of the tail. If there is such extreme 
observation as the one defined by scenario the ID9, then the capital estimates given by the EVT method 
would be unreasonably high and in some cases reaching the amount of BANK total assets! On the other 
hand, if the less extreme average loss case events are added to the data sample, then the capital 
estimates provided by both EVT methods are unreasonably low. The EVT method is thus providing 
inconsistent results, and thus it cannot be considered as the best approach to model the OR data – even 
though the theory suggests that the EVT might be beneficial for the OR measurement. The application of 
the EVT methods to the empirical data provides overestimated results for the worst-case scenarios and 
underestimated results for the average loss scenarios. 
 The results of the EVT method are probably impacted also by the way the parameter estimates 
were computed. In this rigorous thesis the EasyFitXL software was used for this task. Teply, Chalupka 
(2008) suggest using other methods, which might be more feasible for the case, when the tail of the data 
does not contain enough observations. For the BMM method it is very crucial to question, when exactly 
the custom extreme losses happen. Since the number of custom losses as well as the length of observed 
period is quite low, the data generation algorithm might provide biased results. Also the VaR measures 
based on the aggregated loss distribution are very sensitive to the number of MC simulations. For all 
tests in this rigorous thesis we have used 50,000 MC trials. Due to technical limitations it was not 
possible to increase this number further – even though it might be beneficial to use e.g. one million MC 
trials, especially while working with the VaR0.999 or the CVaR0.99 measures. Such task is beyond the focus 
of this rigorous thesis and might be considered for further, more sophisticated, research. 
 However, it is rightly to assume that, even if more sophisticated methods would be used for the 
EVT parameter estimates and the loss aggregation process, the overall results would not probably 
change significantly and so both EVT methods would still overestimate the regulatory and economic 
capital estimates – in some cases the overestimation would be very significant. This conclusion follows 
the findings stated in the paper by Dutta, Perry (2007). On the other hand, Teply, Chalupka (2007) favor 
the EVT over g&h distribution – their conclusion might not consider the scenario analysis and the stress 
testing methods.  
 However, it might be expected that the results provided by the EVT method would improve the 
consistency, as the number of observations, both from the body and the tail of the empirical distribution, 
increases – but even though it might be assumed that the EVT results would still be less consistent than 
those provided by the g&h method. 
 The g&h distribution proved to be a very suitable one. Its results were consistent, as the extreme 
worst case and the average loss custom events were being added to the data sample – this conclusion 
corresponds with the findings of Degen (2007). The parameter estimates differ based on the number of 
the additional extreme events used for the scenario analysis – the more extreme losses were added to 
the data sample the higher the estimate for 𝑕  and 𝑔  was. So in case of Test I the 𝑕  was seven times 
higher than in case of the original data sample – for more details see Table 5.16. The higher the 
estimated parameters, the higher the losses generated during the loss aggregation procedure.  
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 Given the very low probability of the fact that a joint combination of all the worst-case custom 
losses would occur during the observed period, a financial institution should be relatively safe. Even 
though the potential losses assessed by using the g&h distributions are in most cases severe to the bank, 
but it is rightly to expect that even such high magnitude losses can be handled and that the financial 
institution would be able to cover the losses. The level of regulatory capital for all scenario analysis tests 
exceeded 20% of the gross income. 
Table 5.16: Comparison of g&h distribution results- worst case scenarios 
Test Scenario IDs 𝒈  𝒉  Reg.  capital Ec. Capital 
Original n.a. 2.075 0.0509 4.43% 6.71% 
Test we ID1-12 2.210 0.3537 90.74% 236.33% 
Test II ID1-8 2.157 0.2379 35.66% 77.52% 
Test III ID3-5,7-8 2.136 0.1943 20.37% 38.62% 
Test IV ID9-12 2.124 0.1996 21.25% 38.64% 
Test V ID3-5,7-12 2.163 0.3163 70.32% 173.45% 
Test VI ID3-5,7-8,12 2.148 0.2222 29.75% 55.93% 
 Source: Author 
 The g&h distribution is, unlike the EVT, consistent even if less extreme but more frequent 
average loss cases are added to the data sample. In the average loss case the custom losses were of very 
similar magnitude as the most severe empirical losses. So the length of the tail remained the same – it 
was only made heavier. The parameter estimates are very similar to each other and so are the regulatory 
capital estimates. Even if all the scenarios were considered, the estimated regulatory capital would not 
exceed 12% of the gross income suggesting that BANK would be able to handle the losses of such high 
magnitude.  
Table 5.17: Comparison of g&h distribution results – average loss scenarios 
Test Scenario IDs 𝒈  𝒉  Reg.  capital Ec. capital 
Original n.a. 2.075 0.0509 4.43% 6.71% 
Test we ID1-12 2.163 0.112 11.76% 18.96% 
Test II ID1-8 2.157 0.10023 10.09% 14.07% 
Test III ID3-5,7-8 2.136 0.0884 8.75% 12.04% 
Test IV ID9-12 2.082 0.05802 5.29% 7.62% 
Test V ID3-5,7-12 2.141 0.1029 9.00% 13.33% 
Test VI ID3-5,7-8,12 2.148 0.09659 9.27% 14.60% 
 Source: Author 
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 The combination of methods based on the empirical historical loss events as well as the events 
defined in the scenario made the capital estimates more robust to extreme plausible events. It was 
concluded that not the EVT but the g&h distribution is a suitable one for this approach.  
 The statistical fit of the EVT and the g&h distribution was not considered while running the 
scenario analysis tests. It is rightly to assume that the degree of the fit would be approximately the same 
for the average loss joint scenarios, while it can differ for the worst-case joint scenarios that add more 
extreme losses. It is also rightly to assume that the degree of the fit for the EVT methods would be 
generally higher than the degree of the fit of the g&h distribution – but it must be considered that the 
EVT is fitted just to the tail of the data while the g&h works with the whole sample.   
 The other crucial question is, how the tail and the body of the data sample are disbursed and to 
which part of the sample EVT methods are fitted. This rigorous thesis first considered original data 
sample and evaluated the EVT methods which provided the best results. Another methods can be used 
which could provide better results for the merged sample containing both the custom and the original 
OR events. However, this task is beyond the focus of this rigorous thesis. 
  
5.4.1 Implications for the financial institution 
 
 As mentioned above, the scenario analysis added the custom hypothetical losses to the original 
loss database. Six tests were run in order to evaluate the effects of those plausible events on the 
financial distribution. Since all those events impose extreme losses, it was assumed that the estimates of 
the regulatory capital charge as well as of the economic capital would significantly increase. The 
statistical distribution that was finally considered to be the most suitable to measure the capital required 
to cover the OR losses – the g&h distribution – provided reasonable estimates for all the tests run.  
 In the cases where extreme worst-case losses were considered the final estimates for regulatory 
capital charge spiked up to 90% of the gross income. Such huge amount of capital cannot be set aside to 
cover risks, because it would make the financial institution noncompetitive - the cost of its capital would 
be much higher than the industry average. On the other hand, it is hardly to expect that all the worst 
case scenarios will ever happen in such short time period that was considered throughout this rigorous 
thesis – 4 years. But even if a longer time period - like 10 or 20 years – would be considered, the 
probability that the worst case joint scenario from Test I would occur limits to zero. 
 From this point of view it seems more reasonable to work with average loss joint scenario cases, 
which have higher probability of occurrence – in some cases over 2%. The tests that employed the 
average losses provided higher but still affordable level of capital estimates – up to 12% of the gross 
income for the capital charge and 19% of the total equity for the economic capital estimate defined as 
the CVaR0.99 measure.  
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 The conclusion of this rigorous thesis is that the combination of the scenario analysis and the 
LDA approach can improve applicability and soundness of the capital estimates over the methods, where 
just historical data are used. Since new internal and external OR data will be added to the loss databases 
in the future, the quantitative LDA techniques will be more important. But for now it is valuable to 
consider plausible events and evaluate, what would be the impact of these events. After all of the tests 
were run we can say that BANK would be able to survive losses imposed by the average joint scenario 
combination. The losses defined in the worst case scenarios are such extreme, that the bank would have 
to take the risks in order not to increase the cost of capital to an unacceptable level.  
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Conclusion 
 
 The main aim of this rigorous thesis was to evaluate the appropriateness of capital estimates 
based on historical loss events and to measure the impact of plausible OR events that were added to the 
empirical loss data sample provided by a Central European bank. The technique presented in this 
rigorous thesis claims to be consistent and applicable for other financial institutions. There were two 
main questions the rigorous thesis was aimed to answer: 
 What is the appropriate statistical method to model the OR loss data distribution and to 
measure reasonable capital estimates for the institution? 
 What is the impact of extreme events defined in extreme case scenarios on the capital estimates 
and on the financial institution? 
 The evaluation of the OR exposure measurement employed different statistical methods and 
distributions – the most important ones were the EVT and the g&h distribution. For the original data 
sample the results for the EVT seemed consistent, statistically significant and economically reasonable. 
However, after the custom extreme events were added to the data sample, both EVT methods started to 
provide very inconsistent estimates – the inconsistency is most visible while comparing the estimates 
provided by tests, where very extreme worst-case events were considered to tests, where less extreme 
average case events were considered. While in the first case the estimates were unreasonably high, in 
the second case the estimates were even lower than in case of the original data sample. So the EVT 
method does not seem suitable to model the OR data even if it is widely favored by many researchers – 
it is main disadvantage is its sensitivity to the threshold choice. The appropriate threshold is very difficult 
to find given the limited historical data samples. Thus the EVT results were not robust to the data 
contamination and the outlier observations.  
 The alternative method to the EVT was the g&h distribution, which was evaluated as the most 
suitable from all the parametric distributions used. It proved itself very consistent to contamination and 
outlier observations and it provided very reasonable results even while very extreme worst-case losses 
were considered.   
 So the answer to the first question would be that the most suitable method to model the 
operational risk loss data distribution is to use the g&h distribution which is able to model the whole 
data sample “without trimming or truncating the data in an arbitrary or subjective manner”106.  The null 
hypothesis stated in the introduction thus cannot be rejected, because the g&h proved consistent over 
all scenarios that were considered. 
 There might be other statistical distributions that are able to measure and model the tail 
structure of the OR data – we believe that a further research will be devoted to this issue and even more 
suitable measurement methods will be developed. 
                                                             
106 Dutta, Perry (2007) 
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 In order to answer the second question, the original data sample was enriched by adding events 
defined in 12 scenarios. The impact of these events was assessed. Given the fact that the original data 
sample was very limited and it consisted only of internal loss events, it is beneficial for the financial 
institution to measure the impact of such plausible event as an employee strike. In total six tests were 
run. The assumptions, that by adding an outlier event the capital estimate would increase, was fulfilled 
for all tests while using the g&h distribution. If the very low probability joint combination of the worst-
case events was considered, the estimated level of the capital required to cover such losses would too 
high for the bank to set aside - over 90% of gross income for the 99.9% confidence level. It is not 
expected that such combination of extreme events occur in limited time period, so the only reasonable 
solution for the bank is to take this risk.  
 However, if a joint combination of extreme loss events with higher probability of occurrence – 
the average loss scenarios – were considered, the estimated regulatory and economic capital levels 
would be very reasonable capital estimates – 12% of the gross income for 99.9% confidence level. The 
financial institution should employ these OR events, while considering which level of capital to hold to 
cover the risk.  
 And so the answer to the second question is that, given the reasonable definition of the scenario 
analysis and the loss amounts defined under this scenario, the estimated regulatory charge has increased 
significantly but still to a level which is acceptable for the financial institution. The OR assessment 
method should be reasonable for the regulator as well and so this thesis provides a framework of how to 
combine the scenario analysis with the LDA approach. Using the scenario analysis can also help the 
financial institution to mitigate the OR and to decrease the impact of potential losses. This framework 
can be used for future application and the impact of other scenarios can be assessed. 
 Some further questions and tasks remain open. The external data could be merged with internal 
data in order to better capture the potential impact of events that have not happened to the financial 
institution yet. Statistical differences the between business lines and the event types should be analyzed. 
Robust methods or alpha stable distributions can be used as suggested by Chernobai (2007). Other EVT 
methods, particularly for the threshold estimation, could be used. The number of the Monte Carlo 
simulations can be further increased in order to achieve higher statistical relevance. However, this issue 
is beyond the scope of this rigorous thesis and is left for future consideration.  
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